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Author’s Note 
 
As I was completing the final processing of this paper, Argonne director Robert 
Rosner regretfully announced on January 3, 2008, that “effective immediately, IPNS is to 
be shut down….”  Rosner explained that although Argonne management “expected this 
to happen in the next few years, the suddenness of this directive from DOE” came as a 
consequence of surprisingly drastic funding cuts in December 2007. Jack Carpenter, the 
first director and long-standing Technical Director of IPNS,  noted that the decision 
ended “a great era in the scientific history of Argonne National Laboratory” and “the 
development and applications of neutrons for the study of materials” stemming “directly 
from Enrico Fermi’s demonstration of the first self-sustaining fission reaction at the 
University of Chicago’s Staff Field in 1942.” 
 
One of the most gratifying aspects of serving as laboratory historian is the 
opportunity to get to get to know and learn from hard-working, dedicated, creative staff 
members who have made history.  One of the saddest parts of my job is that some who 
share their memories die before my work is finished.  Indeed, this time we all suffered the 
loss of James Jorgensen, who passed away on September 7, 2006. The IPNS community 
also lost James W. Richardson on March 7, 2008. 
 
This paper is, in part, a memoriam to both Jims. I also dedicate this history to the 
entire IPNS staff, past and present. 
 
 
        Catherine Westfall 
        Argonne, Illinois 
        April 2008 
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At first glance the story of the Intense Pulsed Neutron Source (IPNS) at Argonne 
National Laboratory (ANL) appears to have followed a puzzling course. When 
researchers first proposed their ideas for an accelerator-driven neutron source for 
exploring the structure of materials through neutron scattering, the project seemed so 
promising that both Argonne managers and officials at the laboratory’s funding agency, 
the  Department of Energy (DOE), suggested that it be made larger and more expensive.  
But then, even though prototype building, testing, and initial construction went well a 
group of prominent DOE reviewers recommended in fall 1980 that it be killed, just 
months before it had been slated to begin operation, and DOE promptly accepted the 
recommendation. In response, Argonne’s leadership declared the project was the 
laboratory’s top priority and rallied to save it. In late 1982, thanks to another review 
panel led by the same scientist who had chaired the panel that had delivered the death 
sentence, the project was granted a reprieve.   However,  by the late 1980s, the IPNS was 
no longer top priority within the international materials science community, at Argonne, 
                                                
1 The author would like to thank Bruce Brown, Don Geesaman, Gerry Lander, Simine 
Short, and Sunil Sinha for many helpful corrections, comments, and suggestions. Special 
thanks go to Jack Carpenter, who was central to my understanding about the IPNS and its 
history and lent a hand at every stage in the preparation of this manuscript. I am also 
grateful for the help of Rhonda Carpenter, who lent her professional skills to editing this 
manuscript. 
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or within the DOE budget because prospects for another, larger materials science 
accelerator emerged.  At just this point, the facility started to produce exciting scientific 
results.  For the next two decades, the IPNS, its research, and its experts became valued 
resources at Argonne, within the U.S. national laboratory system, and within the 
international materials science community. 
Why did this Argonne project prosper and then almost suffer premature death, 
even though it promised (and later delivered) good science?  How was it saved and how 
did it go on to have a long, prosperous life for more than a quarter of a century? In 
particular, what did an expert assessment of the quality of IPNS science have to do with 
its fate? Getting answers to such questions is important. The U.S. government spends a 
lot of money to produce science and technology at multipurpose2 laboratories like 
Argonne.  For example, in the mid-1990s, about the time the IPNS’s fortunes were 
secured, DOE spent more than $6 billion a year to fund nine such facilities, with 
Argonne’s share totaling $500 million.3  And an important justification for funding these 
expensive laboratories is that they operate expensive but powerful scientific tools like the 
IPNS, generally considered too large to be built and managed by universities. Clearly, 
“life and death” decision making has a lot to tell us about how the considerable U.S. 
federal investment in science and technology at national laboratories is actually 
transacted and, indeed, how a path is cleared or blocked for good science to be produced. 
Because forces within Argonne, DOE, and the materials science community 
obviously dictated the changing fortunes of the IPNS, it makes sense to probe the 
interactions binding these three environments for an understanding of how the IPNS was 
threatened and how it survived.  In other words, sorting out what happened requires 
analyzing the system that includes all three environments.   
                                                
2 A multipurpose laboratory supports many different types of research in contrast to a 
single-purpose laboratory like Fermi National Accelerator Laboratory, built primarily to 
support a single line of research. 
3 Jack Holl, Argonne National Laboratory, 1946-96 (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 
1997),  Appendix 2, p. 506.  Holl’s history is an excellent general source for Argonne 
history that spotlights the relationship between laboratory managers and government 
officials. The other multipurpose laboratories were Brookhaven, the National 
Engineering Laboratory in Idaho, Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory, Lawrence Livermore 
Laboratory, Los Alamos, Oak Ridge, the Pacific Northwest Laboratory, and Sandia 
Laboratory.  
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In an attempt to find a better way to understand its twists and turns, I will view the 
life-and-death IPNS story through the lens of an ecological metaphor.  Employing the 
ideas and terms that ecologists use to describe what happens in a system of shared 
resources, that is, an ecosystem, I will describe the IPNS as an organism that vied with 
competitors for resources to find a niche in the interrelated environments of Argonne, 
DOE,  and the materials science community.4  I will start with an explanation of the 
Argonne “ecosystem” before the advent of the IPNS and then describe how the project 
struggled to emerge in the 1970s, how it scratched its way to a fragile niche in the early 
1980s, and how it adapted and matured through the turn of the 21st century. The paper 
will conclude with a summary of what the ecosystem perspective shows about the life 
and death struggle of the IPNS and reflect on what that perspective reveals about how 
research is produced in the laboratory.  
 
The Argonne Ecosystem Before IPNS 
 Although Argonne always sponsored multiple lines of basic research,  the 
laboratory began life in 1946 focused on the research and development of civilian nuclear 
power reactors, and for more than forty years reactor research and development defined 
Argonne’s place in scientific and technical realms as well as the U.S. as a whole.  From 
the beginning Argonne physicists, chemists, and others doing basic research chafed at 
their place in the scheme of laboratory life, and indeed, they were lower on the food chain 
at Argonne than their basic research colleagues were at other laboratories in the national 
laboratory system, like Brookhaven National Laboratory and Lawrence Berkeley 
Laboratory.5 
                                                
4By niche I mean the response to the distribution of resources and competitors. For more 
on niches in ecology, see Colin Townsend, Michael Begon, John L. Harper, Essentials of 
Ecology (Malden:  Blackwell Publishing, 2003), pp. 106-108. 
5For Brookhaven history, see Robert Crease, Making Physics: A Biography of 
Brookhaven National Laboratory, 1946-1972 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1999). For the beginnings of the Berkeley Laboratory, see John Heilbron and Robert 
Seidel, Lawrence and His Laboratory: A History of the Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989). Since this laboratory has had many 
names, I will use Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory, the name used for most of the period 
under discussion. For a history of the development of the U.S. civilian nuclear power 
industry, see Brian Balogh, Chain Reaction: Expert Debate & Public Participation in 
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It wasn’t until the mid-1950s that the first serious steps were launched so that 
basic research was more prominent within Argonne and that Argonne was more 
competitive in large-scale basic research within the national laboratory system.6  The 
impetus for change came from exciting discoveries in the blossoming field of high energy 
physics, the building pressure in the region for a very large Midwestern accelerator, and 
the desire of Argonne high energy physicists to harness the winds of change to create a 
premier accelerator that would put them – and Argonne – on the map in the prestige-rich 
world of high energy physics.7  
Making the change would require smart experts with ideas for creating a machine 
capable of new, more incisive explorations of matter as well as the resources for testing 
accelerator ideas and eventually building the machine and related equipment.  Argonne 
had such resources, and by the mid-1950s plans were being laid for the Zero Gradient 
Synchrotron (ZGS).  In 1957 the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) authorized 
construction of this machine – a 12.5 GeV proton synchrotron injected by a 50 MeV 
linear accelerator -- for $27 million.8  High-level managerial assistance is always helpful 
in creating a dominant place for a big project; the ZGS got such assistance when Albert 
Crewe was promoted from director of the particle accelerator division to laboratory 
director.  As historian Jack Holl explains, Crew “placed basic research foremost among 
Argonne’s priorities,” pushing “basic research budgets ahead of spending for reactor 
development and other technical programs for the first,” and until 1961 the “only, time in 
Argonne’s history.”9 
As far as Argonne’s materials scientists were concerned, the ZGS would not by 
itself provide the full range of research resources necessary for maintaining a healthy 
multipurpose laboratory.  They seized on the promise by the Joint Committee on Atomic 
                                                                                                                                            
American Commercial Nuclear Power, 1945-1975 (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1991). 
6Other types of cutting edge research were performed during this period, for example, the 
Nobel Prize winning work of Maria Goeppert Mayer on the nuclear shell model. 
7 For a history of the development of the Zero Gradient Synchrotron, see Elizabeth Paris, 
“’Do You Want to Build Such a Machine?’: Designing a High Energy Proton Accelerator 
For Argonne National Laboratory,” ANL/HIST-2, Argonne National Laboratory. 
8 Elizabeth Paris, “Do You Want to Build Such a Machine,” p. 47. 
9 Quote from Jack Holl, Argonne National Laboratory, p. 223.  Also, pp. 196, 208. 
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Energy, the powerful group of Senators and Congressmen who shepherded funding for 
large research projects through Capitol Hill, to provide Argonne with the “essential tools” 
to keep “pace with new developments and new needs.”  Competing laboratories were 
slated to get new research reactors  (for Brookhaven, the High Flux Beam Reactor or 
HFBR, for Oak Ridge the High Flux Isotope Reactor or HFIR) to advance materials 
science, an up-and-coming research endeavor aimed at investigating the relationship 
between the properties of materials and their structure. Materials scientists at Argonne, 
they argued, needed their own major research tool.10  
Crewe did his part to promote the project they wanted, the Argonne Advanced 
Research Reactor (A2R2), which was meant to extend the productive line of research that 
had grown alongside reactor development begun when Enrico Fermi created the first self-
sustaining chain reaction for the atomic bomb effort using Chicago-Pile 1 (CP-1). CP-1 
and subsequent reactors CP-2, and CP-3 did double-duty, testing concepts for power 
reactor design as well as providing neutrons to scatter off a variety of materials to study 
the dynamics and structure of matter. CP-5, which started operating in 1954, was the first 
reactor in the series built strictly as a research tool.  Advancing this line of research 
required higher and higher neutron fluxes, which would allow the study of subtler effects, 
shorter time scales, and smaller samples with higher resolution.  From the Argonne point 
of view it made sense that a new research reactor would continue the laboratory’s 
prominence in reactor development; accordingly, at a cost of $25 million, A2R2,, the 
successor to CP-5, was slated to be the top competitor in neutron scattering with higher 
neutron fluxes than any other research reactor in the world, exceeding the capabilities of 
both HFBR and HFIR.11 
The ZGS and A2R2 proposals enjoyed an abundance of internal resources – not 
only did they have Crewe’s support, but also Argonne had considerable expertise in 
building both accelerators and reactors.  However, both encountered adverse conditions 
in the scientific communities that formed their external ecosystems.  Although the ZGS 
                                                
10 As quoted in Jack Holl, Argonne National Laboratory,  p. 236. On the development of 
materials science, see Bernadette Censaude-Vincent, “The Construction of a Discipline:  
Materials Science in the United States,”  Historical Studies in the Physical and Biological 
Sciences, 31 (2001), p. 223-248. 
11 Jack Holl, Argonne National Laboratory, p. 111-113, 235. 
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was built and began operation in 1963 (at an ultimate cost of $50 million), Cold War 
pressures to build a machine quickly to compete with the Soviets and the strain of 
squabbling within the high energy physics community as well as power struggles over 
Argonne management rendered the machine vulnerable to “interference competition,” 12  
that is, a crippling fight for resources with other facilities.  Unable to place highly in the 
competition for resources, the ZGS was relegated to an inauspicious niche in the high 
energy physics world.  The weak-focusing, 12.5 GeV ZGS had out-dated technology, and 
although it had high intensity, it had lower energy than the already operating strong-
focusing 30 GeV synchrotrons at Brookhaven and CERN, as well as the soon-to-operate 
20 GeV Stanford Linear Accelerator Center, in a field in which achieving the highest 
possible energy was deemed most important.13  
While the ZGS settled into what ecologists call a “realized niche,” 14 that is, a 
niche made narrower because of more successful competitors, A2R2  also suffered 
interference competition: the project lost in the competition for resources with other 
materials science tools and thus failed to find a place in the AEC budget. Although the 
AEC authorized funds for the project in June 1964,  A2R2 remained mired in difficulties.  
From 1965 to 1967 the project suffered cost overruns and resulting complaints from the 
AEC and the Bureau of the Budget,  arguments over core and control rod design that led 
to the forced adoption of an Oak Ridge reactor core design, and a mismanaged safety 
review, all of which annoyed the powerful Milton Shaw, head of the AEC’s reactor 
division. As Holl notes, for  Shaw and his staff  “the A2R2 controversy was an annoyance 
that diverted energy and funds from their principal mission to develop breeder-reactor 
technology” for civilian nuclear power “for the AEC.”  In the meantime, Argonne’s 
engineers had been sidelined from this project after losing a show-down with Shaw who 
                                                
12 In an ecosystem, interference competition involves a fight or other active interaction 
among organisms in a way that threatens the survival of the weak. Colin Townsend, 
Michael Begon, John L. Harper, Essentials of Ecology,  p. 104. 
13 Jack Holl, Argonne National Laboratory,  p. 204. For more on the development of the 
Alternating Gradient Synchrotron at Brookhaven, see Robert Crease, Making Physics, p. 
219-225, 219-225.   For more on the development of the Proton Synchrotron at CERN, 
see Armin Hermann, John Krige, Ulrike Mersits, Dominique Pestre, History of CERN, 
Vol. II:  Building and Running the Laboratory, 1954-1965, p. 95-137 (Amsterdam: North 
Holland, 1990).  
14 Colin Townsend, Michael Begon, John L. Harper, Essentials of Ecology, p. 192. 
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criticized the way they were running the Experimental Breeder Reactor-II and disagreed 
about the best breeder design.  By 1967 Argonne’s Fast Reactor Test Facility had been 
cancelled and money diverted to Pacific Northwest Laboratory’s Fast Flux Test Facility. 
Even worse, Argonne lost its autonomy in planning and managing the laboratory’s 
signature project, research and development for Liquid Metal Fast Breeder Reactors 
(LMFBR).15 
At this point Crewe resigned and was replaced by Robert Duffield. Duffield was 
an experienced manager who had worked with both research and power reactors. In 
addition, he  had successfully worked with Shaw while overseeing the construction of the 
Peach Bottom nuclear power plant in Pennsylvania.16 
Despite his high qualifications, Duffield was not able to shield Argonne from the 
severe adversities that hit within months of his appointment. In April 1968, even with 
frantic last-minute efforts by the new director, A2R2 was cancelled.  At the same time the 
prestigious High Energy Physics Advisory Panel (HEPAP) made a ruling that threatened 
to slam shut the ZGS’s already narrow niche.  HEPAP chair Victor Weisskopf told 
Duffield that it was unacceptable for the ZGS to soak up resources, including scientific 
personnel and technicians and other local technical resources, that should be reserved for 
the nation’s premiere highest energy proton machine which was being built at what 
would be called Fermi National Accelerator Laboratory (Fermilab). He argued, in fact, 
that the ZGS should operate only as long as it took for that lab’s 200 GeV accelerator to 
get up and running. Clearly, by assuming its top niche, Fermilab stripped Argonne of any 
claim that it provided a top-notch regional high energy physics tool and at the same time 
made the ZGS’s relative national standing even lower than it had been earlier in the 
decade.17 The ZGS would escape the squeeze for the time, but as the HEPAP judgment 
made clear, the machine was low enough in the high energy physics pecking order that it 
would fast become extinct, and in the meantime, it would not bring the prestige and 
related resources to Argonne that its planners had expected.   
                                                
15 As quoted in Jack Holl, Argonne National Laboratory, p. 239.  Also, pp. 231, 235-238 
and Catherine Westfall, “Vision and Reality: The EBR-II Story,” Nuclear News, 
February 2004, pp. 25-31. 
16 Jack Holl, Argonne National Laboratory, pp. 240-241. 
17Jack Holl, Argonne National Laboratory, pp. 259-262. 
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Argonne continued to be defined by the LMFBR, but that project languished as 
well, its problems compounded as the 1970s began when the national civilian nuclear 
power program faced mounting public criticism and concern over safety issues.  It was a 
bad time for Argonne to lose a secure niche in the high energy physics and power reactor 
realms:  at just this point the national budget for research and development was 
tightening.  From 1968 to 1971, for the first time in its history, Argonne had to cut its 
workforce, losing a whopping 17% of its staff.18  To survive interference competition 
from other DOE laboratories, Argonne would have to find a way to adapt to an 
environment  within the national laboratory system that had grown harsh and 
inhospitable. 
 
The IPNS Seed Forms 
 Although A2R2 was never built, the project did draw people and ideas that would 
later seed new growth.  Particularly fruitful was the January 1968 gathering of neutron 
scattering experts convened by Donald W. Connor of Argonne’s Solid State Science 
Division to develop ideas for instruments for A2R2. The meeting brought John (Jack) 
Carpenter, a young nuclear engineering professor at the University of Michigan, to 
Argonne. Although the group did not get very far before the reactor was cancelled in 
April, Carpenter made a good impression on his colleagues. A month later he was asked 
to serve on the Argonne Committee on Intense Neutron Sources that Duffield 
commissioned.19 
 The committee assembled accelerator and neutron physics experts like Lowell 
Bollinger, who was interested in improvements for Argonne nuclear physics accelerators, 
and Ronald Martin, who was interested in upgrading the ZGS, as well as neutron 
scattering experts like Carpenter.  The object was to come up with new machine ideas 
that would help Argonne secure its future by developing a new, large research tool. From 
                                                
18Jack Holl. Argonne National Laboratory, pp. 257-262, 279-280; Brian Balogh, Chain 
Reaction, pp. 221-301. 
19 John M. Carpenter, “Living With Neutrons:  A Personal History – 40 Years or so in 
Neutron Scattering,” Shull Prize Lecture, June 2006; Jack Carpenter, “Pulsed Neutron 
Source Development at Argonne,” IPNS Progress Report, 10th Anniversary Edition, 
Argonne National Laboratory, p. 2.  
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the beginning, along with others, Carpenter was interested in figuring out a way to get 
around the limitations of reactors.  Reactors are less efficient for producing epithermal 
(0.1 to 1 eV) neutrons, and in addition, the neutrons they did produce did not have a well-
defined time of origin.  Because it is difficult for detectors to directly measure the total 
energy of neutrons,  reactor researchers had to use time-of-flight measurements to 
measure the neutron energies using “chopping” techniques that reduced flux,  or they had 
to prepare a beam in a small band of energies, which also reduced flux.   In addition, 
reactors had almost reached maximum neutron flux given costs and the heat transfer 
problems inherent in the technology then employed. Moreover, the accelerator neutron 
production process (spallation) is much more efficient than the reactor process (fission).20   
 As Carpenter remembered, the assembled group surveyed “some really wild 
schemes, but we looked carefully at all of them.”  One promising line of inquiry involved 
the use of “spallation,” a term borrowed from geology and stoneworking.21 In this case 
the idea was that the particles in the beam from an accelerator would hit the heavy nuclei 
in a metal target, dislodging numerous light particles, mostly fast neutrons, like chips 
flying from a stone hit with a “spalling” hammer.    Researchers at the Canadian Intense 
Neutron Generator (ING) had produced a study of a steady (reactor-like) spallation 
source at the Chalk River National Laboratory.  Even though Chalk River researchers had 
not found the right technology for exploiting this promising line of work, John Frazer and 
others had measured the spallation neutron yield from various target materials hit with 
protons of different energies. In addition, Ralph Fullwood had plans for a pulsed 
spallation source to be used for weapons research that would be driven by protons from 
the 800-MeV Los Alamos Meson Physics Facility. Researchers at the Nevis 
                                                
20 “Schedule 44 -- Construction Project Data Sheet,” Intense Pulsed Neutron Source 
(IPNS), 1977. “Spallation Source for Neutron Scattering,” Physics Today 35 (1982), pp. 
19-21. 
21 Quote from Catherine Westfall interview with Jack Carpenter, October 8, 2001. The 
term spallation was first used in science by W. H. Sullivan and Glenn T. Seaborg at 
Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory to refer to nuclear reactions in which a struck nucleus 
emits a rather large number of nucleons or fragments.  Bernard G. Harvey, Progress in 
Nuclear Physics, 7 (1959).  
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synchrocyclotron came up with a potentially more efficient experimental set-up, a 
uranium spallation target that produced more neutrons per incident proton. 22 
Spallation-related ideas were not the only ones considered. A particularly 
important development was reported by Martin, who returned from his visit to the Budker 
Institute in the Soviet Union with the news that Gennady Dimov and others there had 
developed an efficient proton beam using a negative hydrogen ion source employing a 
stripping technique.  The advantage of starting with negative hydrogen ions (that is, a 
proton with two electrons) instead of protons is that the stripping process that removes 
the electrons changes the charge sign and facilitates proton injection into a second 
accelerator to get around a severe theoretical constraint, Liouville’s  theorem, which 
otherwise limits beam concentration in phase space.  Dimov’s successful demonstration 
of the process inspired Martin’s idea of increasing the intensity of the ZGS (and thus 
providing additional experimental capabilities for high energy physics research) by 
adding to the accelerating system a 500-MeV rapid-cycling booster synchrotron injected 
by stripping negative hydrogen ions.23 
 All this news was exciting to those interested in advancing neutron scattering 
research because it opened new possibilities for using synchrotrons in their work.  
Synchrotrons naturally produce pulsed beams that can create greater instantaneous flux 
than do steady sources, as demonstrated by the pulsed electron linear accelerators then 
operating.  These electron machines, however, had managed to produce only modest 
neutron fluxes because the electrons interact with nuclei more weakly than protons, 
producing fewer neutrons while producing mostly heat; moreover, they had already 
reached the limits of beam power that their targets could tolerate.  Negative ion stripping 
made a pulsed proton synchrotron seem practical.  Such a machine (if it could be built)  
promised to provide greater fluxes than those produced in pulsed electron accelerators.  
Although a proton synchrotron would likely produce a lower neutron flux overall than 
could be produced in a reactor, the spallation process promised to create short bursts of 
very high-flux neutrons over a very broad energy spectrum (including the epithermal 
                                                
22 Jack Carpenter, “Pulsed Neutron Source Development at Argonne,” IPNS Progress 
Report, 10th Anniversary Edition, Argonne National Laboratory, p. 2; “Spallation Source 
for Neutron Scattering,” pp. 19-21. 
23 Jack Carpenter, “Pulsed Neutron Source Development at Argonne,”  p. 2.  
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range) with a well-defined time of origin so that all  the neutrons could  be used in time-
of-flight-based instruments.  In other words, such a machine promised to produce more 
useful neutrons so that neutron scattering researchers would have the benefit of better 
resolution and the ability to use smaller samples.  This sort of pulsed neutron source, in 
fact, might be just the tool to circumvent the limitations of reactors and become the new, 
top-of-the-food-chain tool for neutron scattering.  
The fact that Martin wanted to upgrade the ZGS by building a booster 
synchrotron with negative-ion stripping injection – and that the machine could potentially 
be used for both neutron scattering and high energy physics experiments --  created a 
particularly golden opportunity for those interested in advancing Argonne’s neutron 
scattering capabilities.  Thus, a key recommendation in the formal report of the 
Committee on Intense Neutron Sources stated, in part, that Argonne’s “objective should 
be consciously aimed at the goal of construction at Argonne of a pulsed neutron source of 
unequaled research capability.”  
As Carpenter later explained, when he returned to the University of Michigan 
from Argonne, ideas for a practical design for a pulsed neutron source were forming in 
his imagination, aided by Frazer’s data developed in support of the Canadian ING 
project, which provided a sound basis for estimating neutron production. The envisioned 
machine would use a synchrotron that would accelerate protons to hit a heavy-metal 
target, creating a stream of fast neutrons.  The stream of neutrons from this pulsed 
spallation source would be slowed with a moderator to energies that could be measured 
with specially designed instruments.  As Carpenter continued making calculations and 
rough designs, he saw the possibility that the spallation process would produce “neutrons 
with much less heat than the fission process in a reactor.”  In pulsed operation, because 
heat flows continuously from the target, high instantaneous power comes with low 
average power. The more he thought about it, the more he was convinced that his pulsed 
neutron source could rival – or even exceed --  the experimental capabilities of a 
reactor.24   
                                                
24 Quote from Catherine Westfall interview with Jack Carpenter, February 14, 2007.  
Also:  John M. Carpenter, “Living With Neutrons.”  
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Although Carpenter’s pulsed neutron source was highly promising,  the proposed 
mode of experimentation was novel and relatively untried.  As he later recalled, the 
consensus of the committee was that priority should be given to proton-driven systems 
and target development, with the proviso that “much more needed to be learned about 
moderator design and science and instruments appropriate for pulsed neutron sources.”25 
 In the meantime, the ideas that would later facilitate the growth of that new 
accelerator first took root at the ZGS, even though ZGS researchers were focused on 
making their accelerator as competitive as possible within the environment of high 
energy physics rather than finding a way to replace the capabilities of the defunct A2R2.  
Competing in their contest hinged on finding a new niche.  Since the ZGS design 
prevented them from achieving the most coveted capability of the highest energy, ZGS 
scientists persevered in their attempt to prevail in the contest for the highest beam 
intensity and to add to other unique capabilities such as aligning the spins of the protons 
and measuring polarized proton interactions. Although ZGS advocates had originally 
beaten out proponents of all other accelerators in beam intensity, this triumph was brief.  
In 1966 due to limitations in AEC funding and the top priority Argonne managers placed 
on other, more pressing priorities, they did not manage to get a $20 million linear 
accelerator injector that would have further improved intensity.  As in the wild, in the 
high energy physics world those at the top of the food chain usually get fed first and 
most, allowing their continued domination:  to the chagrin of ZGS researchers,  in that 
same year Brookhaven obtained $50 million for a 200 MeV linear accelerator as part of 
an Alternating Gradient Synchrotron (AGS) upgrade so that the AGS – which already 
topped the ZGS in beam energy --  also assumed top honors in high intensity (CERN’s 
Proton Synchrotron would soon install a similar upgrade so that it had a similar beam 
intensity and energy as the AGS).26   
 In Martin’s words, what he saw in Novosibirsk in 1968 left him feeling nothing 
short of “elation,” because “if one could develop practical foil stripping at 50 MeV,” then 
they could go on to build a “500 MeV rapid cycling synchrotron” that “could be a useful 
                                                
25 John M. Carpenter, “Living With Neutrons.” 
26 Ronald Martin, “Early History of the Argonne 500 MeV Booster,” in History of the 
ZGS 500 MeV Booster, ANL-HEP-TR-05-44, p. 10. 
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injector for the ZGS.” Argonne could get around the difficulty of competing with other 
higher ranked facilities for upgrade funding because the Novosibirsk device “could be 
built at a small fraction of the cost of a 200 MeV linear accelerator – just what was 
needed at Argonne to improve the intensity of the ZGS beam.” However, when Argonne 
submitted a $5 million proposal to the AEC in 1969 for the synchrotron, it was rejected.27 
 The winds of chance would soon further elevate Argonne’s prospects.  In 1969 
the 2 GeV Cornell electron synchrotron was no longer needed there and became 
available. Martin, then director of the Accelerator Research Facilities Division at 
Argonne, calculated that with some relatively minor changes, including the introduction 
of stripping injection, the discarded accelerator could be modified into a 200 MeV proton 
accelerator and used to test the feasibility of the new injection scheme.  This would pave 
the way for a much larger booster that would allow higher intensity ZGS beams.  Plans 
were quickly made to move the machine to Argonne. (There was poetic justice in this 
inheritance; the Cornell synchrotron, central to hopes to elevate the ZGS’s place in the 
high energy physics ecosystem, had been built by Robert Wilson before he went to lead 
construction of the Fermilab accelerator, the very facility that relegated Argonne to a low 
ranking in the high energy physics world.)28  
 First David Nordby then Jim Simpson led the “rebirthing” of the Cornell machine 
at the ZGS site, a task complicated by the many aging components, particularly the 
vacuum system,  that were “unbelievably fragile” after being shipped from New York.  
While this work proceeded on what came to called Booster I, Martin worked with the 
ZGS source expert John Fasola to make the first tests of charge exchange (or stripping) 
injection.  In 1970 they successfully injected negative hydrogen ions into the ZGS at 50 
MeV.  Although intensities were low, calculations indicated this type of injection would 
likely serve their purposes.29   
                                                
27 Ronald Martin, “Early History of the Argonne 500 MeV Booster,”  pp. 11-12. 
28 Jim Simpson, “History of the ZGS Booster (1969-1978),” in History of the ZGS 500 
MeV Booster, pp. 2-3. As Jack Holl, explains, Wilson himself was fully supportive of the 
ZGS and helped lobby for its continued funding.  Jack Holl, Argonne National 
Laboratory, pp. 261-262. 
29 Jim Simpson, “History of the ZGS Booster (1969-1978),” pp. 4-5.  Stripping injection 
later became standard in high intensity synchrotrons and storage rings.  
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 When Simpson later described the 1972 Booster I beam tests, he exclaimed 
“What a chore!” Because most of the accelerator time was devoted to experimentation, 
only two weeks twice a year was allowed for beam testing. Poor vacuum was a particular 
problem given the poor condition of many of the components.  In addition, the Booster 
group did not enjoy high status among those running the ZGS because by this time some 
figured (correctly as it turned out) that booster injection would not be implemented 
quickly enough to help ZGS experimental prospects, given the limited lifespan of the 
machine.   As a result, at least in Simpson’s opinion, they were “often not well supported 
by the mainstream groups in the ZGS Division.” Nonetheless, the tests proved that 
stripping injection was practical at 50 MeV, and Martin proceeded on a shoestring with 
the construction of the 500 MeV Booster, Booster II, which was operating by 1977.30 
  
Mutualism with the ZGS Host 
In the meantime Carpenter continued to work on the design of a spallation source 
from his university post in Ann Arbor, at the same time keeping in close touch with 
developments at Argonne. He knew from the Canadian ING results obtained while he 
worked with the 1968 Committee on Intense Neutron Sources at Argonne that spallation 
neutrons were produced in large numbers from protons, and he knew that a key technical 
hurdle was finding a moderator to slow neutrons to energies suitable for materials science 
neutron scattering studies. His student, Kingsley Graham, worked on what was the 
biggest problem in this regard at the time:  determining the intensities and the response 
times of the slow neutron beams when extracted from the moderator.  The ZGS Booster 
was central to his plans.  He intended to form a symbiotic relationship with the ZGS 
project;  that is, based on what is called “mutualism” in an ecosystem, the new project 
would attach itself to the ZGS host, but neither project would suffer in the deal.31  As 
Carpenter later noted,  in 1969, based on Graham’s work, he made  “a preliminary 
estimate of the intensities available” from a ZGS Booster-driven  proton spallation 
source, but the resulting figures were rather low and quite uncertain.” That did not stop 
                                                
30Quotes from Jim Simpson, “History of the ZGS Booster (1969-1978),” pp. 4-5; “The 
Booster Project Checks Off Another Milestone,”  Argonne News, February-March 1972, 
p. 2. 
31  Colin Townsend, Michael Begon, John L. Harper, Essentials of Ecology, p. 225. 
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him from coining a snappy name for the device.  With a nod toward the Canadian effort, 
he dubbed it the ZGS Intense Neutron Generator, or ZING for short.32  
Carpenter was close at hand to hear about the Booster I tests because he came to 
Argonne for a sabbatical in 1971-1972. As he later recalled, during the sabbatical he was 
encouraged by the Solid State Science division head Oliver Simpson “to work more on 
the neutron source ideas.” He knew from the beginning that securing a niche would not 
be easy.  European competitors were breathing down their necks – the world’s highest 
intensity neutron research reactor had just started operation at the Institute Laue-
Langevin (ILL) in France.33  
Although Carpenter and his colleagues reviewed “all the crazy schemes” they 
could think of, “the spallation source still came out on top.”  With further encouragement 
from Connor, who then headed the Solid State Science division neutron group, and help 
from other Argonne benefactors,  he obtained the “stock of beryllium blocks that were 
left over from A2R2 criticality experiments,” a “calibrated californium spontaneous 
fission source,” space in the still-standing A2R2 mock-up bay, and assembled “cadmium-
filtered 235U-foil track-etch detectors” and “learned to count fission-fragment tracks under 
a microscope.” Thus armed, he “built a mock-up moderator with a beam port and 
cadmium decouplers inside a beryllium reflector, which seemed to be the best 
material.”34  
With the reflector they got about 10 times more neutron flux than they did in the 
then-standard arrangement without the reflector.  “It was a Eureka! Moment.  The gain 
would not be that great in practice” because the arrangement in the real source would be 
more complex.  However “we knew.” Working with engineer Robert Kleb, Carpenter 
then worked out a basic concept for ZING, the seed that would later grow into the IPNS,  
in the process realizing that with improved moderators and targets, the Booster II 
synchrotron being devised by Martin and others could produce peak thermal fluxes 
                                                
32 Jack Carpenter, “Pulsed Neutron Source Development at Argonne,” p. 2.  
33 Jack Carpenter, “Pulsed Neutron Source Development at Argonne,” p. 2. 
34 Carpenter realized that to preserve the rapid time response of pulsed-source 
moderators, it was necessary to prevent long-lived slow neutrons from the reflector from 
getting into the moderator.  A thin sheet of cadmimum metal, the decoupler, served this 
purpose. Personal communication, Jack Carpenter, February 15, 2006. Text quote Jack 
Carpenter, “Pulsed Neutron Source Development at Argonne,” p. 2.  
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comparable to those at ILL.  As Carpenter noted in a 1972 summary of his work, the 
envisioned “facility would be one of the most intense pulsed neutron sources in the 
world.” In an arrangement with Argonne, in 1973 Carpenter got a patent for the reflector 
idea, receiving a sum total of $26 for the time and effort.35 
The environment continued to provide resources.  Working with Argonne’s David 
Price, in spring 1973 Carpenter convened a conference at Argonne to evaluate how to use 
ZING. As the conference report noted, the new device facilitated unparalleled studies 
using epithermal neutrons, a type of research that could not be conducted in the U.S. at 
HFIR or HRBR, which produce mostly neutrons with the temperature of their 
moderators, or even at the high-flux reactor at ILL, which was starting operations in 
France.36  In addition to considering how the device could be used for radiation damage 
studies on materials, the report explored various types of experiments that could be 
performed using ZING:  high- and low-energy transfer inelastic scattering and diffraction 
from single crystals, powdered crystalline materials, and liquids and glassy solids. 
Although the report presented ideas for optimizing the device, it judged that there were 
no apparent problems with the targets, moderators, or other pieces of the experimental 
equipment. “It seems,” the report noted, “that the final limitations of the facility will 
come only from the absolute intensity of the proton beam available.”37  
The report clearly described a niche for ZING; its conclusions both confirmed and 
expanded upon Carpenter’s initial positive assessment of  the device.  The report  noted 
that “the proposed ZING facility would be more powerful” in the epithermal neutron 
range “than any existing reactor,” also  “that the flux would be comparable to ILL in the 
0.2-0.5 eV region,”  and that “the pulsed feature of the ZING source offers significant 
design advantages for some types of experiments.”  Therefore, the report suggested “that 
the U.S. develop a capacity for this important field of neutron beam research in the near 
                                                
35 Quotes from John M. Carpenter, “Living With Neutrons” and J. M. Carpenter and G. 
M. Marmer, “Evaluation of the ZGS Injector-Booster as an Intense Neutron Generator,” 
ANL/SSS-72-1 (1972), p. 1. Also: U. S. Patent, 3,778, 627, December 11, 1973. 
36 The ILL reactor at the time did not have a higher flux than the U.S. reactors but did 
provide greater research opportunities because of the design of its neutron transport 
system. Personal communication, Gerard Lander, October 14, 2007. 
37 “Applications of a Pulsed Spallation Neutron Source,” Report of a Workshop held at 
Argonne National Laboratory April 29-May 4, 1973, ANL-8032, p. 88.  Also, p. 5. 
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future and that pulsed accelerator-driven spallation sources” were “the most promising 
candidates for obtaining such capability.”38 
An important attendee was Japanese nuclear physicist Motoharu Kimura, who had 
experience with an electron linear accelerator-based neutron source as well as neutron 
scattering experiments at Tohoku University. As Carpenter later recalled, for the sake of 
testing the design ideas that emerged from the conference, Kimura insisted: “You must 
build a prototype!” Kimura returned to Argonne after the conference to help build it, 
bringing along his protégé Noboru Watanabe.39   
In his memoir, Kimura described the reception his ideas got among Argonne 
researchers. He remembers “encouraging support” from those in the Solid State Science 
and Chemistry divisions.  From the Solid State Science division, he singled out Price, as 
well as “Sunil Sinha, a brilliant and powerful Indian physicist” and “the late Aneesur 
Rahman, almost a saintly figure.” In addition “younger physicists,” for example, in the 
field of magnetism, “waited for the construction with high expectations.”  Jack Williams 
and others in the Chemistry division, “especially organic chemistry, put importance on 
the determination of hydrogen positions in hydrogen-containing crystals, feeling that they 
absolutely needed the pulsed neutron facility.” Selmer Peterson “dedicated himself and 
substantial effort of his group to the construction of a single crystal diffraction 
instrument,” even though at first he was not convinced “that the method would be 
effective.”40 
Argonne came up with $30,000 and a great deal of surplus materials for this first 
phase of the project, dubbed ZING-P because it was a prototype.41  Thomas Banfield, 
                                                
38 “Applications of a Pulsed Spallation Neutron Source,” pp. 6-7. 
39 Quote from personal communication, Jack Carpenter, February 15, 2006. Jack 
Carpenter, “Pulsed Neutron Source Development at Argonne,” p. 3. 
40 Motoharu Kimura with John M. Carpenter, Living With Nuclei:  50 Years in the 
Nuclear Age – Memoirs of a Japanese Physicist (Sendai Japan: Sasaki Printing and 
Publishing Company, 1993).  
41 The surplus equipment included battleship armor for shielding that had originally been 
brought to the site for shielding for the ZGS.  Carpenter later remembered that when 
Argonne Deputy Director Michael Nevitt saw markings on the armor he cried:  “BB58! 
That’s my ship! That’s the battleship Indiana.”  Indeed, he had previously served as a 
naval officer on that very ship, the Indiana.  Personal communication, Jack Carpenter, 
February 15, 2006. 
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then head of CP-5,  would provide Argonne oversight of the project, which would 
involve building a small, shielded enclosure above the ZGS Booster I beam line as well 
as a target in a lead-shielded beryllium reflector that was designed with the help of 
Kimura and Bob Kleb.  ZING-P was fed protons from the booster accelerator, which was 
just then being completed. The protons from Booster I hit a target consisting of  “one half 
of a lead brick” with “a copper tube” soldered to it to “carry off the heat.”  The resulting 
neutrons would then be slowed in polyethylene moderators and proceed through “two, 
nearly vertical beam holes.” These beam holes supported two instruments, a time-focused 
powder difffractometer and a crystal analyzer inelastic scattering instrument that were 
placed, in Carpenter’s words,  in “a tiny shielded house.” ZING-P was finished by 
January 1974 and “built on top of the earth-mound shield between the Booster and the 
ZGS in an area called ‘Skunk Hollow’.”  Carpenter and those helping him “had to scurry 
up and down the muddy bank that winter to get to the instruments.”  The device operated 
three times for several-month periods during 1974 and 1975 before Booster I was shut 
down.42 
During this time a large number of researchers, including Carpenter and Kimura, 
made and published measurements that were aimed at showing the experimental viability 
of the device. Carpenter later noted that an important initial result was that in the course 
of experimentation, the intensities measured were as expected, which gave the green light 
to continue to the next incarnation of ZING, ZING-P', which was similar to its 
predecessor except it had an improved target and three horizontal beam holes and would 
operate with the upgraded ZGS booster synchrotron, Booster II.43 
                                                
42 Quotes from Jack Carpenter, “Pulsed Neutron Source Development at Argonne,”  p. 4. 
Also:  J. M. Carpenter, “Pulsed Spallation Neutron Sources for Slow Neutron Scattering,”  
Nuclear Instruments and Methods 145 (1977) pp. 91-113. 
43 Jack Carpenter, “Pulsed Neutron Source Development at Argonne,” p. 4; J. M. 
Carpenter et al. “Neutron Diffraction Measurements on Powder Samples using the ZING-
P Pulsed Neutron Source at Argonne,” Proc. Neutron Diffraction Conferences, Petten 
(1975); M. H. Mueller, et al., “Structure of Th4D15 from Measurements at the Argonne 
ZING-P Pulsed Neutron Source, J. Applied Crystallography, 10 (1977), p. 79; A. 
Rahman et al., “Photon Spectra of Non-Stoichiometric Palladium Hydrides,” Phys. Rev 
B14 (1976), pp. 3630-3634; J. Roziere and C. V. Berney, “Neutron Scattering Study of 
Cesium Hydrogen Dintrate,” Journal of the American Chemical Society 98 (1976), pp. 
1582-1583.   
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Growing to Fit a Niche 
 In the mid-1970s, environments evolved, both at Argonne and in Washington.  
The AEC was disbanded in 1974.  Its regulatory functions were shifted to a new agency, 
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and the rest of the AEC turned into the short-lived 
Energy Research and Development Agency (ERDA), which became the Department of 
Energy in 1977.  While these changes were taking place, Robert Sachs, an eminent 
theoretical physicist, served as Argonne director.  Although LMFBR continued to be the 
laboratory’s main initiative, it shrank in 1977 to only 40% of the total Argonne budget. 
The energy crisis was raging, and energy-related programs were flourishing at Argonne 
as elsewhere.  But such work did not use a single, central tool, and national laboratories 
had traditionally been defined (and their funding justified) by large, state-of-the-art 
instruments.  With Argonne reactor projects languishing and the ZGS on its last legs, a 
niche appeared:  Sachs and others seeking Argonne’s best interests were open to ideas for 
a new, large machine.44  
 In response to these changes, in 1974, as Carpenter later recalled, “the powers,” 
that is, officials in Washington as well as administrators at Argonne, “encouraged us to 
think up a larger-scale facility – ZING was not powerful enough.” As Carpenter and 
others began scaling up their spallation source plans, they were encouraged, in particular 
by officers of the laboratory’s operating contractor, the Argonne Universities Association 
(AUA). AUA President Paul McDaniel took Carpenter aside and gave him a piece of 
advice: “the new higher powered facility” should be called “by a name that could not be 
pronounced. Make them say what it is.” Besides, “ZING was too cute.”  Turning to a 
simple description of its function, Carpenter renamed the project the Intense Pulsed 
Neutron Source, and the name stuck.45   
                                                
44 Jack Holl, Argonne National Laboratory,  pp. 291, 314.  Alice C. Bush, A History of 
the Energy Research and Development Administration (DOE/ES-0001, Washington, 
1982), p. 2,14; “New Energy Department:  Who Will Champion Research?” Physics 
Today 30 (1970), p. 110. 
45 Quotes from Jack Carpenter, “Pulsed Neutron Source Development at Argonne,” p. 5-6 
and Catherine Westfall interview with Jack Carpenter, December 19, 2006. 
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 Price, head of the Solid State Science division, offered Carpenter a full-time staff 
position at Argonne.  Tired of commuting from Ann Arbor to Chicago and excited about 
the prospects for the IPNS,  Carpenter resigned from his position as Professor of Nuclear 
Engineering at Michigan. Just as he arrived in January 1975, he heard the news that a 
previously submitted Energy Research and Development Agency funding request has 
been approved.  They now had $175,000 to develop a conceptual design.46  
T. Khoe, Kimura, and Carpenter laid out basic plans for proceeding to the larger 
machine the times seemed to call for. The pulsed neutron source originally conceived as 
the final incarnation of ZING would be IPNS-I, which would provide experience for 
building a larger IPNS-II.  As planned, IPNS-I would have 5 x 1012 protons per pulse, a 
proton energy of 500 MeV, 20 neutrons per proton, and a peak thermal flux of 1015 
n/cm2-sec. IPNS-II would have a 5 x 1013 protons per pulse, 800 MeV proton energy, 30 
neutrons per proton, and a peak thermal flux of 1016 n/cm2-sec. Both versions would use a 
238U target.47  
Along with Sam Werner, a University of Michigan physicist working there at 
Ford Scientific Laboratory, Carpenter convened another workshop in June 1975 to 
evaluate the potential of the IPNS within the context of other neutron sources in the 
materials science ecosystem, meanwhile identifying potential scientific applications and 
acquainting would-be users with the IPNS. The workshop had nine panels of scientists 
who “were charged with two tasks – to compile scientific problems” and  “to propose and 
evaluate the instrumental means to accomplish the measurements.” Since the new pulsed 
source promised higher resolution and the ability to use smaller samples,  those planning 
the IPNS wanted to explore the many ways that a wide variety of scientists (that is, not 
just condensed matter physicists) could use this tool to explore the properties of different 
materials.  Thus, in addition to a panel on neutron sources and one on radiation effects, 
the workshop included panels on biology; chemical spectroscopy; chemical structures in 
                                                
46 Jack Carpenter, “Pulsed Neutron Source Development at Argonne,” pp. 5-6. 
47 T. Khoe and M. Kimura, Feasibility Studies of an Accelerator for the Intense Pulsed 
Neutron Source, ANL/SSS-74-1 (1974); J. M. Carpenter,  “Uses of Advanced Pulsed 
Neutron Sources,” Report of a Workshop held at Argonne National Laboratory, October 
21-24, 1975, ANL-76-10, p. 4. 
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crystalline solids; chemical structures of disordered solids and inhomogeneous systems; 
dynamics of solids, liquids, glasses and gases; and magnetism.48 
As the workshop report noted, numerous “advanced pulsed source systems were 
emerging.” These included “the present and the scheduled new Harwell electron linear 
accelerator sources in the U.K., the series of Soviet pulsed fast reactors, IBR-I, IBR-30, 
IBR-II; the Soviet electron linear accelerator source at Kurchatov; the Japanese electron 
linear accelerator source operating at Tohoku; the proposed Japan Linac Booster; the 
operating electron linear accelerator source at Toronto, Canada; the studied application of 
the Oak Ridge Electron Linear Accelerator for neutron scattering; the nearly completed 
Weapons Neutron Research Facility (WNR-PSR)  at LAMPF; and the Argonne pulsed 
neutron sources.” The report also highlighted the “High Flux Reactor at the Institut Laue-
Langevin,” noting that it represented the highest evolution of the steady state research 
reactor” and provided “a thermal neutron flux of about 1.2 ! 1015/cm2-sec.”49 
According to the report, within the ecosystem of neutron sources there was a 
fertile niche just waiting to be filled:  neutron scattering was “the most general 
experimental technique in condensed matter research.”  It could yield “direct microscopic 
information which is inaccessible by any other technique and in many other cases 
produced results which are completely complementary to the information obtained from 
other physical measurement methods.”  So far, the technique had found applications in 
“biology, chemistry, physics, and materials science,” and applications were “growing 
constantly.” The perfect fit for this empty niche was, of course, the IPNS.   “It is clear 
from the panel reports of this workshop that the construction of an advanced pulsed 
neutron source, such as IPNS, would expand the realm of scientific problems accessible 
to neutron scattering enormously in many directions.” 50   
To further boost the growth of the budding new project,  in January 1976 IPNS 
promoters called a Pulsed Neutron Source Users Group meeting to let potential users 
know of ongoing plans and to invite proposals.51 In the meantime, Carpenter, Kimura, 
                                                
48 Quotes from “Uses of Advanced Pulsed Neutron Sources,” p. 1.  Also, pp. 11-15. 
49 “Uses of Advanced Pulsed Neutron Sources,” p. 3. 
50 “Uses of Advanced Pulsed Neutron Sources,” p. 6. 
51 J. M. Carpenter, D. L. Price, and N. J. Swanson, “IPNS – A National Facility for 
Condensed Matter Research,” ANL-78-88, November 1978, p. 32.  
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and others were preparing to build and use ZING-P' to fill in the gaps of their knowledge 
so that they could bring to life the envisioned larger, more powerful IPNS.  
 
Mutualism Turns to Scavenging  
ZING-P' began operation in 1977 with the completion of Booster II and ran for 
three years.  Before this milestone was reached,  however, the ZGS’s death sentence 
became official.  In 1976 ERDA announced that funding for the machine would be cut in 
the next few years.52  Since the facility’s death had long been eminent, this came as no 
surprise to anyone. As a matter of fact, for IPNS planners, the timing of this tragedy for 
the high energy physics group could not have been better.  In 1977 and 1978 they were 
presenting their funding and design plans to the funding agency.  For the first time they 
were free to openly engage in appropriating what they needed from the ZGS; that is, they 
took resources (in this case accelerator components) that the ZGS had used to stay viable, 
in the process saving time, money, and effort. Thus began a role-reversing turning-point: 
instead of being a small attachment living off the ZGS host without harming it, the 
spallation neutron source was slated to itself become the host, scavenging the parts of the 
dying ZGS as it lapsed into extinction. 
Another advantage was that ZING-P', which, after all, had been built as a design 
tool, was just the right device available at just the right time to provide information for 
the emerging stand-alone IPNS design.  IPNS designers were particularly focused on 
moderator and target design. Carpenter remembers trying out liquid-hydrogen moderators 
developed by Kleb and Bob Stefiuk.  The moderators did not work well but did reveal 
some unanticipated problems.  Nonetheless, with the help of  David Mildner from the 
National Institute of Standards and Technology and Argonne’s Ted Postol they were able 
to do measurements with cold neutrons (that is, neutrons cooled to near absolute zero), an 
important demonstration.  Scientists already had realized that spallation neutrons provide 
a greater flux of epithermal neutrons useful for studying high energy excitations and 
determining precise atomic positions.  Cold neutrons, on the other hand, provided greater 
opportunities for diffraction studies of large-scale structures and for high-resolution 
measurements of low-frequency excitations. Measuring the pulse widths and spectra for 
                                                
52 Jack Holl, Argonne National Laboratory,  p. 330. 
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different moderators produced data that would be essential to instrument design for the 
IPNS. Kleb and Henry Thresh designed and Thresh produced a Zircaloy-clad uranium 
target that worked well, though the prospect raised safety issues that were challenging to 
work through. From 1978 to 1979,  besides doing research measurements, Carpenter, 
Kimura, Kleb, and Al Knox of Argonne’s Engineering Division measured the energy 
deposition in the uranium and tungsten targets and developed other technical data needed 
for the IPNS design.53  
IPNS designers also had other concerns.  For example, they wanted to know how 
much heat was generated in the moderators so they could design  a cooling system.  They 
also wanted to build flexibility in ZING-P'.  Before the ZGS closure was announced, Bob 
Kleb, who was considered by most to be Price’s best engineer, had developed a 
pneumatically driven actuator to allow sharing of the proton beam with the ZGS. 
Although that target feature was never used, the design included drawers in a reflector-
shield assembly that allowed them to easily exchange moderators and to insert various 
items near the source for tests.54   
The IPNS group also needed more experience in building and using the novel 
instruments necessary for making measurements with the groundbreaking accelerator. 
This job was assumed by Argonne experimenters,  mostly those who had been 
performing neutron scattering on CP-5. There was some grumbling.  For one thing, IPNS 
measurements, which were performed on pioneering, untried equipment, diverted 
researchers from on-going, more reliable CP-5 measurements in a field in which careers 
are made with steady, weekly accumulation of solid data.  In addition, Argonne did not 
have the scientists or support staff to support both CP-5 and the IPNS; inch by inch, the 
IPNS was taking over CP-5’s niche at Argonne. Despite the sacrifice – and the risk that it 
would be in vain if the IPNS did not pan out – the group built a number of new 
instruments that would form the basis for the equipment used for the IPNS. To lend a 
hand and to help jump-start their efforts to recruit IPNS outside users, the budding IPNS 
group invited colleagues outside Argonne and set up its scientific proposal system to 
                                                
53 Jack Carpenter, “Pulsed Neutron Source Development at Argonne,” pp. 5-6; Catherine 
Westfall interview with Jack Carpenter, December 19, 2006. 
54 Jack Carpenter, “Pulsed Neutron Source Development at Argonne,” pp. 5-6. 
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share the use of the new instruments. Even though ZING-P' was mainly a testing device, 
the new instruments produced many publishable experimental measurements.  James 
Jorgensen, who built a time-focused diffractometer at ZING-P' and later instruments at 
IPNS, would later note that this was the best diffractometer he had ever used.55  
When ZING-P' began operation in the fall of 1977 the IPNS’s prospects for 
gaining funding also seemed promising, although from the beginning it was apparent that 
they would have to compete for its niche.  The National Research Council of the National 
Academy of Sciences, which was charged with assessing research facilities and scientific 
opportunities using low-energy neutrons in condensed matter physics,  declared that 
“major scientific achievements” could be made “in both present and unexplored areas 
with new-generation pulsed-spallation neutron sources with their very-high-peak neutron 
flux and readily tailored neutron spectra.” The panel accordingly recommended that the 
funding agency (by then the newly formed DOE) make “an immediate commitment” to 
procure “such high-flux sources.” The panel specifically suggested that DOE support the 
very course that the IPNS group – and the Los Alamos group designing the WNR-PSR -- 
were pursuing:  “Design studies should be made and funding support should be scheduled 
for the phased development stages leading to the creation of a national center with a high-
flux (1016 thermal neutrons cm-2 sec-1 peak) pulsed-spallation neutron facility provided 
with the associated instrumentation required for effective use.”56 
Norman Swanson, an Argonne engineer with experience in building nuclear 
facilities, was brought in as project manager, and Carpenter, Price, and Kleb provided 
                                                
55 Carpenter devised the time-focused technique used in Jorgensen’s diffractometer. Kurt 
Sköld, Kent Crawford, and Sow-Hsin Chen (Massachusetts Institute of Technology) 
designed a crystal analyzer spectrometer. Selmer Peterson created the idea for and with 
Art Reis built a single crystal diffractometer, and Mel Mueller, with the assistance of 
John Faber and Chuck Borso, created a small angle scattering instrument that would 
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Development at Argonne,” pp. 4-6; M. Kimura and John M. Carpenter, “Living With 
Neutrons”; Catherine Westfall interview with Jack Carpenter, December 19, 2006; 
Catherine Westfall interview with Sunil Sinha, March 6, 2007. 
56 National Academy of Sciences, “Neutron Research on Condensed Matter: A Study of 
the Facilities and Scientific Opportunities in the United States,” Washington D.C., 1977.   
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DOE officials with what Carpenter later characterized as an “innumerable” succession of 
planning and cost documents.  In line with the National Research Council suggestion of 
phased development, DOE officials asked IPNS planners to give the cost of a prototype, 
IPNS-I,  separate from the 1016 machine, IPNS-II. Carpenter later remembered that he 
and Price “recognized the risk that if we once separated the two components of the 
project, only IPNS-I might be funded.” They worried, however, that if they “did not 
respond,” they “might lose it all” and, therefore, complied with the request.  They 
accordingly responded that although the total facility would cost $70 million,  they could 
build the IPNS-I for $9 million. They carefully stipulated, however, that the low IPNS-I 
cost assumed IPNS-II construction; without the second phase, IPNS-I would cost more, 
since staff funded for the larger project would do double duty if both projects were 
carried out together.57 
In April 1977, Argonne sent the formal request for the two-staged project and the 
next year prepared a report giving details. The report explained that the IPNS-I would be 
an upgrade of ZING-P'  and serve as a prototype for IPNS-II.  It would employ the 
Booster II proton synchrotron, now called the Rapid Cycling Synchrotron (RCS), and use 
the same negative ion stripping injection scheme developed in Booster I. The ion source 
was mounted in the terminal of another ZGS component, a 750-kV Cockcroft-Walton 
preaccelerator.  In such a system, ions are created in a hydrogen plasma. Electromagnetic 
fields then separate negative hydrogen ions, which are subsequently accelerated from the 
high-voltage Cockcroft-Walton terminal and swept into a linear accelerator that further 
accelerates them.  The negative hydrogen ions then pass through bending and focusing 
magnets and enter into the RCS, where a polymer film “stripper foil” strips off the 
electrons to produce a circulating proton beam that electromagnetic forces then accelerate 
to produce a 500 MeV pulsed beam for IPNS-I. A heavily shielded beam line carries the 
pulsed proton beam to a target of depleted uranium to produce short pulses of fast 
neutrons by spallation.  Moderators arranged around the target slow down the fast 
                                                
57 Quotes from John M. Carpenter, “Living With Neutrons” and Jack Carpenter, “Pulsed 
Neutron Source Development at Argonne,”  p. 7. Also:  Jack Holl, Argonne National 
Laboratory,  p. 412. 
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neutrons to the desired (milli-electron-volt) energies. The resulting neutrons then pass 
through 12 beam holes to support a wide array of measuring instruments in IPNS-I.58  
 
 
Figure 1:  Early IPNS Plans. From: “Schedule 44 – Construction Project Data 
Sheet for Intense Pulsed Neutron Source (IPNS),”  1977. The lower left shows a source 
for slow neutron scattering; the lower right shows a fast neutron radiation effects facility. 
 
 
The report also described IPNS-II (Figure 1), which would be a 800-MeV high-
flux (1016 thermal neutrons cm-2 sec-1 peak) neutron source based on a new synchrotron  
called the High Intensity Synchrotron, or HIS.  The larger and more powerful HIS would  
be placed in the abandoned ZGS main-ring tunnel, which would serve as its radiation 
shield.  The pre-accelerating system consisted of a negative hydrogen ion source and a  
                                                
58 A beryllium reflector around the target and moderator enhanced the slow neutron flux.  
The original plan to cool the beryllium to liquid nitrogen temperature did not work out.  
Personal communication, Jack Carpenter, June 7, 2007. Text references:  Jack Holl, 
Argonne National Laboratory, p. 412; J. M. Carpenter, D. L. Price, and N. J. Swanson, 
“IPNS:  A National Facility for Condensed Matter Research,” pp. 67-78. 
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750-kV Cockcroft-Walton, like IPNS-I, but IPNS-II would employ a more powerful 100-
MeV linear accelerator. The IPNS-II target would be made of steel-plated depleted 
uranium or a uranium-molybdenum alloy. The envisioned site also included a Radiation 
Effects Facility, which would continue work begun at CP-5 by a group led by Tom 
Blewitt. This facility would employ the IPNS proton beam with its own separate target, 
which would be surrounded by irradiation cryostats kept at helium temperatures (4 K).59   
(Figure 2)  
By the time of the report, it was already clear that the project would benefit not 
only from the demise of the ZGS, but also by the death of CP-5, which, like the ZGS, 
would close in 1979. Scavenging equipment was a substantial advantage. Initial estimates 
indicated that the savings gained from using existing ZGS equipment would save at least 
25% of the cost of the facility.60  
 
 
                                                
59 J. M. Carpenter, D. L. Price, and N. J. Swanson, “IPNS:  A National Facility for 
Condensed Matter Research,” pp. 73-75; Department of Energy, “Schedule 44 – 
Construction Project Data Sheet for Intense Pulsed Neutron Source (IPNS),”  1977. 
60 Department of Energy, “Schedule 44 – Construction Project Data Sheet for Intense 
Pulsed Neutron Source (IPNS),”  1977. 
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Figure 2:  IPNS Facility as described in J. M. Carpenter, D. L. Price, and N. J. 
Swanson, “IPNS – A National Facility for Condensed Matter Research,” ANL-78-88, 
November 1978. 
 
 
 
At this stage IPNS designers reaped another benefit from the ZGS – they would 
take traditions as well as equipment.  ZGS scientists had been among the first in high 
energy physics to stress the importance of outside user access when it began operation in 
1963. Carpenter and Price would later judge that one of the greatest resources obtained 
from the ZGS was the user-friendly tradition for operating the IPNS.  Although this 
approach is key in gaining the constituency political support and the funding of a large 
instrument – and by this time it was the approach expected by DOE for nuclear and high 
energy physics facilities --  up until this time it had not been the usual practice at U.S. 
neutron facilities because of their relatively modest size. An extra advantage of early 
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IPNS outside user involvement was that only a small percentage of materials scientists 
used neutron scattering devices.  By publicizing their efforts, they could hope to educate 
potential users about the capabilities of the device, thereby building interest and creating 
a larger user community to advocate for continued resources for the machine.61 
IPNS designers highlighted their plans for operating the accelerator in their 1978 
report. In a section devoted to explaining the “policy and for operation and use” of the 
IPNS, they announced that the accelerator would “be a user-oriented national facility 
available to all interested and qualified scientists,” noting that they expected a “majority 
of users … to come from outside ANL, representing universities, industrial corporations, 
and government-sponsored research laboratories throughout the nation.”  They were not 
shy about touting the novelty of their plans:  they stressed that the  “user orientation” of 
the IPNS would represent “a unique mode of operation for neutron facilities in the 
U.S.”62 
User response to the 1978 document was good.  In the year of its distribution 
proposals streamed in from around the world.  In addition to a proposal for inelastic-
scattering and diffraction studies,  one proposal was submitted for neutron-damage 
studies on materials for the Tokamak Fusion Test Reactor.63 
 
 
                                                
61 Catherine Westfall interviews with Jack Carpenter,  October 8, 2001, and David Price, 
November 16, 2001.  Edwin Goldwasser, who headed the users group at the ZGS, would 
later say that his ZGS experience was key in the late 1960s in setting up policies for 
assuring access at Fermi National Accelerator Laboratory, where he served as the first 
deputy director.  For more on how the push for outside user access shaped the 
development of Fermilab, see Lillian Hoddeson, Adrienne Kolb, and Catherine Westfall, 
Physics, the Frontier, and the Rise of Megascience, forthcoming, University of Chicago, 
2008. For more discussion on the importance of gathering interested users for large 
projects, see Robert Smith, The Space Telescope (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1989).  Gathering a constituency would also be important for the experimental 
program of the Advanced Photon Source in the 1990s, as described in Catherine Westfall, 
“A Different Laboratory Tale:  Fifty Years of Mössbauer Spectroscopy” Physics in 
Perspective, 8 (2006), pp. 189-213. 
62J. M. Carpenter, D. L. Price, and N. J. Swanson,  “IPNS:  A National Facility for 
Condensed Matter Research,” p. 174. 
63 J. M. Carpenter, D. L. Price, and N. J. Swanson, “IPNS – A National Facility for 
Condensed Matter Research,” p. 34.  
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Times Get Hard 
Even though plans for the IPNS rose along with the promise of resources, the 
project faced a series of adverse conditions just as its construction began in the late 
1970s.  The first blow came in late 1978 when DOE faced a tight budget that drastically 
narrowed the IPNS’s niche. To the dismay of Carpenter and Price, DOE officials 
therefore decided to proceed with IPNS-I only and provided a mere $6.4 million for the 
job. Although the IPNS-II was not formally killed, Argonne was forbidden from spending 
any money – even the director’s discretionary funds – on its design. At that point, as 
Carpenter later recalled, they faced the “agonizing decision” of “whether to accept the 
project or not, realizing the difficulty of the funding shortfall.” After further negotiation,  
DOE agreed to the plan of using the allotted money for facilities construction only and 
allowed Argonne to submit a separate proposal for equipment.  Although the IPNS group 
estimated that the equipment would cost $3 million, with what they thought was the usual 
prudent contingency for the risk of unexpected or unusual circumstances, DOE balked.  
In the end IPNS received $2.4 million for equipment funding and agreed to be ready for 
operation and use in spring 1981. According to their updated plans, the IPNS complex 
would include the Cockroft-Walton and a 50 MeV linear accelerator,  the 500 MeV RCS, 
the spallation target, and the equipment needed for neutron scattering measurements, as 
well as the Radiation Effects Facility and its separate target, both in the same massive 
shield. 64 (Figure 3)  
 
 
                                                
64 Quotes from Jack Carpenter, “Pulsed Neutron Source Development at Argonne,”  p. 7.  
“IPNS Newsletter,” May 1979, p. 1. Also, Jack Holl, Argonne National Laboratory,  p. 
413. 
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Figure 3.  IPNS as eventually built.  From: “Presentation to DOE Neutron 
Scattering Review Panel, August 3-4, 1980.” 
 
 
 
Construction began in May 1979 with,  in Carpenter’s words, the “grim 
determination” to adapt, despite the disappointment of their scaled-back plans and deep 
concern about the tight schedule and limited budget, which they had to meet regardless of 
rampant inflation. One advantage was that the Argonne environment yielded more usable 
resources than expected.  Carpenter later calculated that about $40 million worth of 
equipment was salvaged from the ZGS and CP-5.  The ZGS “inheritances” included not 
only the accelerator system (the RCS, 50-MeV linear accelerator, and negative hydrogen 
ion source), but also buildings and infrastructure, including water, cooling towers, 
electrical power, and roads.  For its part, the CP-5 provided an instrument and various 
instrument components as well as shipping casks, which became beam stops.  As was 
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typical at Argonne, the most important resource was smart people.  In this case, in 
Carpenter’s words, those “with experience in accelerator and neutron source technology” 
and also those “with world-class expertise in neutron scattering.”65 
Robert Kustom, long-time Argonne accelerator expert, assumed responsibility for 
the IPNS accelerator systems. He tapped veteran Argonne accelerator experts who were 
available to tackle the difficulties, including Yang Cho and Ed Crosbie, who had both 
been central to the development of the ZGS. Because Carpenter’s skills lay more in 
design and construction than in administration, as IPNS construction was gearing up he 
opted for the job of technical director, a job that at this stage mainly involved 
development of moderators, targets, and instruments.  A young research physicist, Bruce 
Brown, who had worked with Blewitt’s group on radiation effects, agreed to be 
operations manager.  Price agreed to become the project director. This team began 
construction of the IPNS alongside the ZING-P' run, which continued to provide 
engineering data and research until it was terminated in August 1980 to allow installation 
of the beam transport system connecting the RCS and the IPNS.66 
Although Kustom and his staff were valued additions to the IPNS effort, the times 
were not without strain.  In their words, the staff consisted mainly of specialists who had 
previously worked on the ZGS and “had a high energy physics background.”   Seeing the 
IPNS build on the abandoned bones of the high energy physics machine could not have 
been easy for them.  The process was further complicated by what Kustom later 
described as a “major culture shock and clash between the accelerator staff and the 
instrument, materials science, and condensed matter scientific staff.”  High energy 
physics experimenters at that time “tended to acquire and integrate data over long periods 
of time, sometimes years, and often were tolerant of frequent shut downs,” especially 
since many of them had built accelerators early in their careers and understood that 
accelerators were being pushed to their limits to get the best possible performance.   By 
                                                
65 Jack Carpenter, “Pulsed Neutron Source Development at Argonne,”  p. 7 and John M. 
Carpenter, “Living With Neutrons.” For further analysis of the importance of smart 
people in the development of science at Argonne, see Catherine Westfall, “A Different 
Laboratory Tale:  Fifty Years of Mössbauer Spectroscopy,” pp. 189-213. 
66 J. R. Simpson, R. Martin, and R. Kustom, “Improvements of the IPNS Accelerator 
System,”  History of the ZGS 500 MeV Booster,  p. 15, “IPNS Newsletter,” September 
1980, p. 1. 
ANL/HIST-5 
 33 
contrast, “materials science users previously got their neutrons from a nuclear reactor,” 
and because of safety concerns, reactors were built conservatively and operated very 
reliably.  In addition, “many materials science and condensed matter users” performed 
experiments with “highly unstable crystals or samples.”  Their data runs were short, and 
“unexpected shutdowns of a day or more often interrupted their data collection stream 
and forced the data collection to be aborted.”67 
Kustom later remembered feeling he had his work cut out for him. Potential IPNS 
users clearly had high expectations for the reliability of the accelerator, and given the 
tenuous beginning of the project, those building the project could ill afford to disappoint 
them.  Kustom recollected that the accelerator availability when he took over in 1978 
“was on the order of 65% or a bit worse,” a level of reliability that was typical for high 
energy physics research facilities but was sure to appall materials science users.  Part of 
the problem was that “some hardware was forced to be hand-me-downs or compromised 
by limited funding,”  but an additional problem was that they experienced “the kinds of 
infancy problems that occur when first-of-a-kind equipment that is not commercially 
available is brought on line.”  In his opinion, the “most difficult hardware problems … 
were related to the pulsed extraction system magnet, the kicker magnet system, and the 
stripping foils.” The “basic machine parameters and the proof of design” had been 
successfully demonstrated by the ZING prototypes.  However, there were also accelerator 
physics problems that needed to be solved, particularly beam losses at injection and 
extraction and in the extraction septum magnet. 68  
Those constructing the rest of the facility had their own technical problems. Price 
remembered fighting to keep the ZGS shielding from being sent to the nearby Fermilab. 
To some in DOE and elsewhere it made more sense to shift resources from one high 
energy physics project to another rather than have resources from a high energy physics 
project shift to a condensed matter accelerator.  After all, ZGS and Fermilab were both 
                                                
67 J. R. Simpson, R. L.  Martin, and R. Kustom, “Improvements of the IPNS Accelerator 
System,”  History of the ZGS 500 MeV Booster,  pp. 15-16. 
68 Quotes from:  J. R. Simpson, R. Martin, and R. Kustom, “Improvements of the IPNS 
Accelerator System,”  History of the ZGS 500 MeV Booster,  ANL-HEP-TR-06-44, p. 16. 
Also:  “IPNS Newsletter,” March 1980, p. 1;  “IPNS Monthly Report,” September 1980, 
p. 2. 
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high energy physics accelerators managed by the same DOE office. IPNS builders, who 
desperately needed to use whatever was available from the ZGS to keep to their very 
tight budget, ultimately prevailed. Carpenter remembered a long difficulty caused by 
faulty communication with the contractor supplying the cooling systems for the 
moderator.  The problem was finally resolved when they realized the contractor had been 
told the systems were to be kept cold by using liquid methane but had somehow not been 
told that they not only needed to be cold,  but also the systems must always be full of the 
substance.  For his part, Swanson worried that the accelerator would not start on schedule 
in spring 1981 because of picketing by a union of electrical workers in March and April 
and again in October of 1980 due to a “jurisdictional dispute” that caused periods of time 
during which “no construction workers reported to work.”69 
Despite these challenges, IPNS builders made their promised deadlines.  As Price 
announced   “at 3 PM on Tuesday, May 5, 1981, the first protons were delivered to the 
radiation effects target in the IPNS-I facility,” and on “August 4, the 500 MeV proton 
beam hit the neutron scattering target for the first time.” Price went on to note that they 
had protons on the target exactly a year after ZING-P' was shut down, which he judged to 
be “a most creditable performance for all involved.”  In addition, “The first four neutron 
scattering instruments were ready as planned to receive the first neutrons on August 4, as 
was the data acquisition system.” With construction complete, Swanson went on to other 
Argonne duties.70  
Preparations were also being made for the planned, large user program.  In 
February 1981 Argonne issued a call for proposals and called together a users group 
meeting at the American Physical Society meeting the next month. In June, the first IPNS 
Program Committee – composed of eminent scientists from outside Argonne -- a 
milestone because, as Price noted, “This was the first meeting of its kind at a neutron 
facility in the U.S.”  This program committee “received a total of 119 proposals 
submitted and selected 38 to run during the first round of user experiments.” Although 
                                                
69 Quotes from “IPNS Monthly Report,” October 1980, p. 1. Also:  Catherine Westfall 
interview with David Price, November 16, 2001 and Jack Carpenter, “Pulsed Neutron 
Source Development at Argonne,” p. 8. 
70 Quotes from “IPNS Monthly Report,” May 1981, p. 1 and “IPNS Monthly Report,” 
August-September 1981, p. 1.  
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Argonne users conducted the initial research, by fall 1981 outside users were using 
instruments for measurements approved by the committee.71  
 
Losing Their Niches? 
 Despite success and progress, as construction ended and the IPNS began 
operation, conditions became even more adverse. Although IPNS researchers did not 
know it at the time, the problem started with a DOE review panel led by William 
Brinkman from Bell Telephone Laboratories, which visited the laboratory in August 
1980.  The Brinkman panel was meant to follow up on the NRC recommendations.  
Subject to funding constraints, the DOE charge was to assess, first, “the continuing 
validity of the 1977 National Research Council recommendation for pulsed-spallation 
sources to complement existing steady state reactor sources and second, “the requirement 
for and necessary attendant resources (manpower and dollars) for a supporting materials 
research program located at and directly associated with currently authorized neutron-
spallation sources.”  DOE stipulated that “if the review determines that there is a 
continuing requirement for pulsed-spallation capability within the constraints of the 
present budget outlook,” reviewers should address “the performance characteristic of the 
best pulsed sources to meet program needs” and “the amount and specific source of funds 
within the DOE neutron scattering program required to support an optimum program at 
this facility.”72   
By this time, a panel of accelerator and neutron facilities experts led by Richard 
Neal of the Stanford Linear Accelerator Center had produced a report that provided,  
according to an IPNS monthly report, “a good picture of the plans, status, and problems” 
of the IPNS as well as the WNR-PSR at Los Alamos and concluded “that both projects 
should be able to reach their goals.” 73 
                                                
71 “IPNS Monthly Report,” August-September 1981, p. 1.  
72 “Presentation to DOE Neutron Scattering Review Panel, August 3-4, 1980.” In 
addition to Brinkman, the panel included John McTague from UCLA,  John J. Rush from 
the National Bureau of Standards, Robert Birgeneau from the Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology,  Borris Batterman from Cornell, and Frederick Vook from Sandia National 
Laboratory. 
73 “Presentation to DOE Neutron Scattering Review Panel, August 3-4, 1980.” 
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In October 1980 the Brinkman panel released its report.  Panelists went out of 
their way to celebrate the importance of neutron scattering research, stating that the field 
“provides essential and unique information about the microscopic nature of a broad 
spectrum of phenomena occurring in fields as diverse as materials science and biology.”  
Panelists also made the case that the U.S. had lost its dominance in the field to Europe, 
where France, Germany, and the United Kingdom jointly operated the research reactor at 
ILL, which enjoyed more than twice the funding received by all U.S. neutron scattering 
research.   The panel even requested a $6 million a year funding increase for neutron 
scattering.74 
However, panelists had to take into account their charge as well as the tenor of the 
times.  When discussing their report with Science, James Kane, who as director of DOE’s 
Office of Basic Energy Sciences was responsible for overseeing U.S. neutron scattering 
research, stressed his concern that “neutron scattering expenses” would “swamp his 
research budget at the expense of other energy-related programs” at a time of dwindling 
resources. Anticipating such sentiments, panelists drew sharp distinctions and made hard 
choices.  They judged that the two existing 15-year old research reactors, Brookhaven’s  
HFBR and Oak Ridge’s HFIR – which were after all based on tried-and-true technology -
- would “be the mainstays of our neutron scattering research programs” through the 
1990s, and funding for these reactors had been too low in the 1970s “for continued 
vitality.” Therefore, they assigned “first priority to increased support of the two reactor 
facilities.”75  The reactors were “exploitive competitors” that threatened to hobble the 
IPNS by reducing resources. Even worse, the Los Alamos project became an “enemy” 
that threatened “competitive exclusion”; that is, it was poised to steal the IPNS’s niche.76   
In light of funding constraints, committee members explained, only one pulsed neutron 
source could be supported, and Los Alamos’s WNR-PSR, a proton storage ring operating 
with facilities paid for by DOE’s Office of Military Operations,  had a winning 
                                                
74 “Report of the Review Panel on Neutron Scattering,”  October 22, 1980. 
75 Quotes from Arthur Robinson, “Will U.S. Skip Neutron Scattering Derby?” Science 
211 (1981), p. 263 and “Report of the Review Panel on Neutron Scattering,”  October 22, 
1980. For more on Brookhaven’s High Flux Beam Reactor, see Robert Crease, “Anxious 
History:  The High Flux Beam Reactor and Brookhaven National Laboratory, Historical 
Studies in the Physical and Biological Sciences 32 (2001), pp. 41-56. 
76 Colin Townsend, Michael Begon, John L. Harper, Essentials of Ecology, p. 197. 
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advantage:  it would run as an offshoot to that program and therefore draw little money 
from the limited neutron scattering budget.  Therefore, to the dismay of Argonne 
researchers, the IPNS fell prey to the Los Alamos machine.  The Brinkman panel 
recommended supporting the Los Alamos pulsed source and terminating IPNS-I unless 
funding increased.77 
Argonne’s IPNS had failed to justify its existence in the battle for scarce 
resources with neutron scattering machines at Brookhaven, Oak Ridge, and Los Alamos 
and therefore appeared to be on the brink of losing its niche in DOE’s budget.  The news 
could not have come at a worse time for the laboratory.  Ronald Reagan had been elected 
President in 1980, and shortly after assuming office in 1981 he began trimming budgets 
in line with his policy of reducing government spending.  Various reviews were ordered 
of the entire national laboratory system and the findings were not positive.  Rumors 
swirled that the system might be closed. Argonne’s situation seemed particularly 
precarious. The competition for research funding became increasingly cut-throat as 
laboratories, universities, and industry vied for diminishing federal funding.  Under 
President Carter the crunch had been eased by increased funding for environmental 
programs, but the Reagan administration made clear that these budgets would also be 
slashed.  And the laboratory would get no relief from the civilian reactor program:  
LMFBR continued to face a skeptical Congress and White House.78 
Walter Massey, who became Argonne’s director in 1979, faced a rather 
frightening situation.  Since the late 1970s, in light of the problems facing other 
laboratory projects, Argonne managers had declared the IPNS to be the laboratory’s 
“highest priority.”79 The laboratory had been looking to the IPNS not only for funding, 
but also for users, prestige, and a continued rationale for existence. It was a perilous time, 
a time when it appeared only the fittest would survive.  And the potential loss of IPNS’s 
niche threatened the niche of the laboratory itself at a time when the fate of the entire 
national laboratory system was in doubt.  
                                                
77 “Report of the Review Panel on Neutron Scattering,”  October 22, 1980.  
78 Jack Holl, Argonne National Laboratory,  p.398. For a discussion of budget problems 
of the time, see pp. 389-403. 
79 “DOE Project Review,” Project Review with Director of Office of Energy Research,” 
May 1980.  
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Securing a Niche? 
In the wake of the Brinkman panel report, DOE decided to terminate IPNS 
funding in 1983.  Thus, in early 1981, the IPNS team labored to bring to life a machine 
that was already slated for an early death.  In the words of Brown, “it was a real struggle. 
There was nothing to do but try to hang in there and get the job done the best we 
could.”80   
In the meantime, Massey, together with Kenneth Kliewer who became the 
Associate Laboratory Director for basic research in early 1981,  sprang into action to do 
what he could to save the fledgling project.  Gerard Lander, a former CP-5 user who had 
left Argonne to work at the ILL, later remembered that Massey gathered him and others 
to help. In Lander’s words, the Brinkman panel judgment was “a devastating blow” to 
Massey, who “took it seriously and personally.”81  
Massey wanted to overturn the Brinkman panel recommendations, but this was a 
difficult and risky task.  Massey had done a postdoctoral fellowship at Argonne in the 
Chemistry and Solid-State Science divisions.  Although he was therefore familiar with 
IPNS science, he was a theorist without particular expertise in neutron scattering.  How 
could he possibly rebut the recommendation of expert peer review? Another problem was 
that George (Jay) Keyworth, a former Los Alamos manager, had just been appointed 
Reagan’s science advisor. IPNS supporters worried that a high-profile fight to oust Los 
Alamos from the single niche allowed for a U.S. pulsed neutron source would backfire.82 
Although they mentioned IPNS scientific potential, Massey and Kliewer ended up 
emphasizing an institutional and regional rather than a scientific rationale for continued 
                                                
80 Quote from Catherine Westfall interview with Gerard Lander and Bruce Brown, June 
22, 2006. Also, Jack Holl, Argonne National Laboratory, p. 414. 
81Quote from Catherine Westfall interview with Gerard Lander and Bruce Brown, June 
22, 2006. Jack Carpenter later remembered that he simply never believed during this 
period that the IPNS would die prematurely and simply re-doubled his efforts on the 
technical side. Personal communication, Jack Carpenter, October 5, 2007. 
82 Jack Holl, Argonne National Laboratory, p. 352; Biographies of Aerospace Officials 
and Policymakers, National Aeronautics and Space Administration, NASA History 
Division, http://history.nasa.gov/biosk-n.html;  Catherine Westfall interview with Gerard 
Lander and Bruce Brown, June 22, 2006. 
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IPNS operation.  They started with the acknowledgement that Argonne would be 
damaged if the IPNS was terminated and then stressed the greater damage that would 
result. Argonne’s “health and vitality” depended on the IPNS, Massey told the DOE.  
And as they argued in a September 1981 position paper to the laboratory’s contractor, 
AUA, “Argonne, and  the basic energy sciences effort in the Midwest, would be left 
without a major research facility, thereby adversely affecting a large segment of the 
university community and the relationship between the laboratory and the universities.”83 
Lander remembered that they lobbied mid-level officials like Donald Stevens and 
Louis Ianniello of DOE’s Materials Science division.  However, they consciously 
avoided a large-scale letter-writing campaign and also did not press the issue with the 
Illinois Congressional delegation “because we were worried that doing so would inflame 
the situation and get Jay Keyworth involved.”84  
Alongside Massey’s behind-the-scenes lobbying, IPNS researchers pressed their 
case within the materials science community.  They emphasized that pulsed neutron 
sources were the way of the future. All new and planned sources were accelerator-based, 
including the KENS spallation source that had begun operation in 1980, which 
Yoshikazu Ishikawa and Watanabe developed at the Laboratory for High Energy Physics, 
KEK, in Japan’s Tsukuba “Science City”; a 1100 MeV linear accelerator with a storage 
ring, SNQ, being proposed by German researchers at Karlsruhe and Jülich that could 
produce a neutron flux of 1017 n/cm2 –sec; and a British project (later named ISIS) 
employing a 800 MeV proton synchrotron at Rutherford Laboratory that was slated to 
provide a neutron flux of 1016/cm2-sec and scheduled to begin operation at the end of 
1984.  Because the IPNS would be a little more powerful than the Japanese machine, it 
would be the most powerful pulsed source of its kind until Los Alamos and European 
facilities began operation. Thus, the IPNS would provide early scientific results, test the 
scientific utility of such a device, and also produce crucial technical data helpful to the 
development of the other projects.85 
                                                
83 Quotes from Jack Holl, Argonne National Laboratory, pp. 414 and 415. 
84 Quotes from Catherine Westfall interview with Gerard Lander and Bruce Brown, June 
22, 2006. Also, Jack Holl, Argonne National Laboratory,  p.  415. 
85 Like the IPNS, the British machine rose from the ashes of an abandoned high energy 
physics accelerator. Gerard Lander, “IPNS: Pointing the Way to New Frontiers in 
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IPNS researchers also stressed the scientific potential of the machine and their 
ongoing efforts to make the IPNS available to outside users. A September 1981 Science 
article quoted Stevens explaining,  “They’re fighting for their lives.” In the opinion of 
Science’s Arthur Robinson, to avoid this fate, Argonne “not only” had to “demonstrate 
the scientific productivity of its pulsed source,” but also had to “develop a user 
community in a land where researchers are generally uneducated as to the benefits of 
neutron scattering.” It was, he concluded, “a tall order to fill in a short time.”86  
At this point Argonne researchers were quick to point out their already developed 
user-friendly policies, which were unique in the U.S.  Price and Carpenter told Robinson 
that in a departure from previous practice in neutron scattering, they had assigned “25 
percent of beam time to the exclusive use of the research groups that develop and use the 
instruments.”  They also got a bit of publicity about their experimental capabilities, which 
at this stage included uncooled, graphite-reflected polyethylene moderators and targets of 
depleted uranium. Robinson also reported that four instruments were operational:  a 
single crystal diffractometer, two powder diffractometers, and a low-resolution, medium-
energy chopper spectrometer.  In addition, three more were being built: a high-resolution 
chopper spectrometer, a small-angle diffractometer, and a crystal analyzer spectrometer. 
(The choppers, which remove unwanted parts of the neutron spectrum, are not necessary 
for such applications as diffraction but are necessary for chopper spectrometers in pulsed 
sources. These applications require additional choppers or narrow-band energy selectors 
if used without a pulsed source.)  Robinson also noted the activities of the June program 
committee.  Less flattering was the report that due to budgetary restrictions, the IPNS was 
able to run only half the expected time, and thus only 39 proposals were accepted, 10 of 
which were for radiation damage studies.87 
                                                                                                                                            
Materials Science,” logos, TPD-LOGOS-1; Arthur Robinson, “Argonne’s Pulsed 
Neutron Source Turned On,” Science, 213, September 1981, pp. 1097-1099.  For more on 
the development of the Japanese device, see Motohoru Kimura with John M. Carpenter, 
Living with Nuclei. 
86 Arthur Robinson, “Argonne’s Pulsed Neutron Source Turned On,” p. 1097. 
87 A chopper is a slotted, phased rotating device that defines a short pulse of neutrons. 
Quotes from Arthur Robinson, “Argonne’s Pulsed Neutron Source Turned On,” p. 1097. 
Also:  “IPNS Users Bulletin,” October 1981, “IPNS Users Bulletin,” May 1982. 
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In November 1981 Price stepped down as IPNS director to be replaced by Lander, 
who brought valuable experience from ILL in running a robust users program. In 
Lander’s words, for the next year they “did everything we could think of to save 
ourselves.”  For Lander’s part that meant doing what he could to help the project adapt by 
continuing improvement of accelerator performance, instrument development, and 
building the user program. Lander and his team solicited another round of proposals, and 
in March 1982 the program committee assessed 79 proposals and accepted 37. In 
Lander’s words, the proposals showed a particular interest in “spectroscopy at high 
energy transfer and low momentum transfer,” an area “unique to pulsed sources.” As 
IPNS experimenter Chun Loong later explained, the early round of experiments 
absolutely had to achieve two goals. “One was to prove that studies of the structure of 
crystals performed by Jorgenson and others using the IPNS and the powder 
diffractrometers were equally good or better than such work performed by reactors.”  In 
addition,  “we needed to show the promise for groundbreaking future work.”  An early 
example of the latter was the innovative polarized neutron reflectometer developed by 
Gian Felcher.  Although the device was originally developed to measure the penetration 
depth of a magnetic field, it proved surprisingly well-suited for examining polymer and 
magnetic films and surfaces.88 
 As Lander reported to users in May 1982, with the exception of difficulties with 
the innovative cryogenic moderator, which was redesigned and reinstalled,89 “all systems 
have worked extremely well.”  He was particularly proud of accelerator operation, which 
improved so that they were able to perform “almost all the scheduled experiments” up to 
that point.  Machine performance continuously improved so that by the end of the year, it 
had 90% reliability.90 
                                                
88 Quotes from “IPNS Users Bulletin,” May 1982 and interview with Catherine Westfall 
interview with Chun Loong, February 16, 2007.  Also:  “IPNS User’s Bulletin,” October 
1981. 
89 As Carpenter later explained,  the problem with the innovative cryogenic of “cold” 
moderators resulted from a design decision made in haste. For more on the details of the 
problems and how it was fixed, see Jack Carpenter, “Pulsed Neutron Source 
Development at Argonne,” p. 9. 
90 “IPNS Users Bulletin,” May 1982. 
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A stream of other visitors also came to see the facilities, including local 
politicians; Stevens,  Ianniello, and Alvin Trivelpiece from DOE;  National Science 
Foundation director John Slaughter; various congressmen; and Keyworth.  As reported in 
the users newsletter, Brown and Lander had “become so expert at 25 minute tours that 
rumor has it they are being sought after as White House tour guides.” In the meantime, 
Massey met with the other laboratory directors, and Douglas Pewitt, acting director of 
DOE’s Office of Energy Research, stressing the political inadvisability of shutting down 
the IPNS so soon after its operation and on the heels of the ZGS and CP-5 closures.91 
In the midst of these high-level negotiations,  Stevens and Ianniello convened 
another review panel, again chaired by Brinkman,  this time to focus exclusively on 
pulsed neutron sources.  In June 1982 panelists visited both Los Alamos and Argonne.92 
This time the panel reported back with good news.  In December 1982, Lander 
proudly quoted the panel’s finding that Argonne had made “outstanding progress in 
establishing a strong user program.”  As Science noted, the second Brinkman panel also 
declared that “without question” the IPNS had “demonstrated its value in a variety of 
experiments and will be effectively used for research in condensed matter physics, 
materials science, and molecular biology for the next few years if funding is available.”93 
Thus by late 1982 the IPNS had two strong arguments for its continued existence.  
Massey had warned that damage would occur to the larger ecosystems of the national 
materials science community as well as the Midwestern research community if the IPNS 
were lost and Argonne suffered. (This argument undoubtedly resonated at least in part 
because the loss of Argonne would have damaged the national laboratory system and its 
patron, DOE, at a threatening time.) In addition, a group of materials science experts 
judged that the IPNS was a valuable research tool for their field. These arguments were 
                                                
91 Quotes from “IPNS User Bulletin,” May 1982. Also:  Jack Holl, Argonne National 
Laboratory, p. 415. 
92 “IPNS Users Bulletin,” December 1982.  Catherine Westfall interview with Gerard 
Lander and Bruce Brown, June 22, 2006. 
93 Quotes from “IPNS Users Bulletin,” December 1982.  Second quote also in Arthur 
Robinson, “Pulsed Neutron Sources Okayed,” Science 217 (1982), p. 922. 
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persuasive enough that DOE approved a few more years of funding, although the facility 
continued to operate on a limited schedule.94 
The next two years brought change. In spring 1984 the National Academy of 
Sciences of the National Research Council convened a committee, led by the scientific 
elder statesman Frederick Seitz (then at Rockefeller University) and Dean Eastman at 
IBM, charged with assessing “priorities for major facilities for materials research.”95 The 
recommendations of the committee made clear that the IPNS had not successfully made 
the case that pulsed sources were the way of the future.  Committee members gave first 
priority to a 6-GeV synchrotron radiation source capable of producing an increase in 
brightness (flux per unit area) greater by orders of magnitude than any previously 
available, thus opening the possibility of studying material structure directly through 
imaging. With a nod to the argument that the materials science community still needed 
neutron sources as well as the photon-producing synchrotron radiation sources,96 
members gave second priority to a new high-flux reactor, the Advanced Neutron Source 
(ANS) to be built at Oak Ridge.  Third priority went to a smaller light source to be built 
at Berkeley.  The proposal for a new, larger spallation pulsed source that Argonne 
researchers hoped to build was at the bottom of the list at fourth priority.97 
On the heels of the Seitz-Eastman committee, DOE convened another panel 
chaired by Peter Eisenberger of Exxon to create a design for the first-priority 6 GeV 
                                                
94 John Walsh, “For Argonne, Criticism and a Comeback,” Science 218 (1982), pp. 354-
357. 
95 Quote from National Research Council, “Major Facilities for Materials Research and 
Related Disciplines,” DOE-S-0037, Files of Klaus Berkner papers, Lawrence Berkeley 
National Laboratory, Archives and Records, Berkeley, CA 94720 
96 Unlike photons, which interact by electromagnetic interactions, neutrons interact 
primarily by the strong force and thus are only weakly affected by the electrons in atoms.  
This allows neutrons to probe deeply into a sample and also to distinguish atoms with the 
same number of surrounding electrons but different nuclei.  The magnetic properties of 
neutrons also make them better probes of microscopic magnetism inside materials. 
97National Research Council, “Major Facilities for Materials Research and Related 
Disciplines,” DOE-S-0037, Files of Klaus Berkner papers, Lawrence Berkeley National 
Laboratory, Archives and Records, Berkeley, CA 94720.  Argonne researchers presented 
plans for a new machine that would replace the Rapid Cycling Synchrotron with a high-
current accelerator, the Argonne Super-Pulsed Spallation Source (ASPUN) after first 
building a model, “Mini-Aspun.” “Major Facilities for Materials Research and Related 
Disciplines,”  National Academy Press, 1984, pp. 411-432. 
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synchrotron radiation source.  Under its auspices, this panel convened a workshop and 
created a site-independent cost and schedule study.  By the time this work was finished, 
Kliewer and other Argonne managers outmaneuvered the competition, convincing DOE 
to site the facility, which they called the Advanced Photon Source (APS), at Argonne; the 
success of the IPNS as a user facility bolstered these arguments. Work on designing and 
constructing the project began in 1987 under the direction of David Moncton, who 
initially came on loan from Exxon but eventually agreed to head the facility.  The project, 
which was eventually designed and built to operate at 7 GeV,   had a high price tag (it 
would eventually cost more than half a billion dollars with related experimental 
equipment).  However, from the beginning its financial prospects -- along with prospects 
for the national laboratory system in general – benefited from the “boomlet” in physics 
funding that accompanied Reagan’s defense budget in the mid-1980s. As the fortunes of 
Argonne’s civilian nuclear power program continued to decline, the APS became the 
large project that Argonne would look to for resources, prestige, and survival.98  
 
Adaptation, Maturation, and Spreading Seeds  
During the next twenty years, the IPNS successfully adapted,  establishing a 
narrow but sustainable realized niche within the international materials science 
community, at Argonne, and within the  DOE budget. But the going continued to be 
rough.   Starting in the 1980s and continuing through the beginning of the 21st century, 
the U.S. lost its edge in neutron scattering research.  The ILL continued to be the top 
notch research reactor.  In addition, the pulsed neutron source ISIS became the most 
powerful of its kind after it began operation in 1984 at the Rutherford-Appleton 
Laboratory near Oxford in Britain.  Soon thereafter the experienced British neutron 
scattering community, which had been trained at Harwell (in Britain) and ILL (in 
                                                
98 “Reagan’s 1985 R&D Budget: Defense Boom, Physics Boomlet,” Physics Today 37 
(1984), p. 55-60; “Key Decision Nears on Proposed Argonne Photon Source,” Physics 
Today, 40 (1987), p. 71; Holl, p. 472, Catherine Westfall interview with Daniel Lehman, 
January 24, 2001. 
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France),  led neutron scattering research. The Japanese also built a strong research 
program on their smaller pulsed source, KENS.99 
There was no more talk of cutting Argonne or the DOE national laboratory 
system from the federal budget.  In fact,  DOE manager Alvin Trivelpiece and the 
directors at Brookhaven, Argonne, Oak Ridge, and Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory struck 
at deal in 1986  aimed at strengthening individual laboratories as well as the national 
laboratory systems by embracing mutualism and minimizing inter-laboratory interference 
competition.  All agreed to support a major project for each laboratory.  Brookhaven 
would get the Relativistic Heavy Ion Collider for nuclear physics research, and the other 
laboratories would each get one of the three top-priority materials science projects named 
by the Seitz-Eastman committee: the synchrotron radiation sources for Argonne (the 
APS) and Berkeley (the Advanced Light Source) and the ANS reactor for Oak Ridge. 100 
Of course the IPNS could not have survived without Argonne, so in that way the 
Trivelpiece plan helped the IPNS.  However, it did little otherwise to raise IPNS 
prospects. Within the materials science community the IPNS was a pulsed neutron source 
at a time when synchrotron radiation sources and a reactor project were favored, and the 
IPNS also faced potentially fatal competition from its enemy pulsed neutron source at 
Los Alamos.  The situation was all the worse because of the nature of materials science 
research:  advances in the field invariably require that the data from large facilities be 
combined with that from small equipment at university labs, which meant that the IPNS 
had to compete not only with the higher priority large facilities,  but also with many 
university laboratories for U.S. materials science funding.  The IPNS also faced other 
competitors in other venues: ILL and ISIS researchers had secured the top rung in the 
neutron scattering community while the APS had the edge at Argonne.  Clearly, IPNS 
researchers could not command resources by arguing that their facility was the most 
capable machine in neutron scattering or materials science, and IPNS managers could not 
expect the laboratory management to go to the mat for them if funding dried up. After all, 
                                                
99 Martin Blume and David E. Moncton, “Large Facilities for Condensed-Matter 
Science,”  Physics Today 38 (1985), pp. 70-73;  private communication, Gerard Lander 
and Bruce Brown, July 26, 2007. 
100 Alvin Trivelpiece, “Some Observations on DOE’s Role in “Megascience,” History of 
Physics Newsletter, IX (2005), p. 14. 
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Argonne’s pulsed neutron source was no longer a do-or-die proposition for the 
laboratory.  
Amid the continuous threat of closure, the IPNS managed to eke out a continued 
existence. Through the mid-1980s, Argonne’s pulsed neutron source was saved thanks to 
an unexpected resource flow:  funding from the burgeoning defense budget. IPNS 
generated approximately 10% of its funding from a special project led by Charles Potts, 
head of the accelerator group that used the pulsed source to measure neutral particle 
beams for the Strategic Defense Initiative. IPNS managers also saved money for neutron 
scattering measurements by eliminating the Radiation Effects Facility in 1985 and 
continuing half-time operation.101  
Despite the limited funding and running time, the IPNS managers had to pave the 
way for scientific success, a goal that required a sizable and productive user community. 
Thus, first Lander, then Brown (who assumed the IPNS directorship in 1986 when 
Lander left for Europe) continued aggressive efforts to recruit users and enhance IPNS 
experimental capabilities. In addition to installing cryogenic methane moderators and a 
77% enriched uranium target, IPNS personnel increased the beam current from 10-12 to 
14-15 µA and the number of neutron scattering instruments to 11.  IPNS scientists, 
engineers, and technical staff continually improved instruments, notably by installing 
larger numbers of better detectors.  Further, responding to users’ needs, they developed a 
great variety of specialized environmental equipment for samples. Also, the accelerator 
staff managed to provide beam as scheduled 91% of the time.  This record, they boasted, 
was “by far the world’s record for pulsed neutron sources.”  This high reliability helped 
make the most of limited running time and, in addition, helped retain users, since most 
came to the laboratory to make measurements for only a few days and would not 
continue to use the facility if they went home empty handed.  The figures told a success 
story:  even though the hours of IPNS operation decreased from 1983 to 1988, the 
number of users and experiments increased. 102  (Table 1) 
 
                                                
101 “IPNS Progress Report 1986-1988,” p. 1. 
102 “IPNS Progress Report 1986-1988,” pp. 1-4.  
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IPNS User Program Statistics for FY83 – FY88 
 FY83 FY84 FY85 FY86 FY87 FY88
* 
Weeks of Operation 26 29 21 22 21 18 
Number of Experiments Performed 110 210 180 212 223 226 
Visitors to IPNS for at Least One 
Experiment 
      
Argonne 41 49 44 52 55 54 
Other Government Laboratories 9 8 7 11 15 17 
Universities 33 45 51 79 78 79 
Industry 5 9 7 13 24 17 
Foreign 18 39 34 27 24 16 
 106 150 143 182 196 183 
*
2 weeks to be run early in FY89       
 
Table 1:  IPNS Neutron Scattering Instruments.  From: “IPNS Progress Report 1996-
2001.” 
 
By the end of the 1980s, the IPNS also had a high-profile scientific success story. 
When high-temperature superconductivity was discovered in 1986, Jim Jorgensen and 
others realized that their powder diffractometers were well matched to the structural 
complexity of the new superconducting materials.  In 1987, Jorgenson and others 
published the solution of the structure of the first high-temperature superconductor – 
yttrium-barium-copper-oxygen – which would make the covers of magazines.  In the 
words of Sinha, by then a researcher at Exxon,  this and other IPNS work on 
superconductivity – over 175 papers in all -- “helped put IPNS on the map.”103 
Scientific success was necessary but not sufficient for continued survival.  Science 
reported in 1996 that “other lab researchers give IPNS officials high marks for squeezing 
a lot of science from a relatively weak source.” Nonetheless, DOE rejected Argonne’s 
request for a megawatt-level IPNS upgrade, and DOE officials were “considering closing 
IPNS to help cover the costs of upgrades at other labs.”104 
                                                
103Quote from Catherine Westfall interview with Sunil Sinha, March 6, 2007.  The work 
of Jorgensen and his team made the cover of Nature, 327 (1987).  J. D. Jorgensen, 
“Scientific Highlights of Argonne’s Neutron Scattering Program,” June 22, 2006, 
unpublished document, J. D. Jorgensen et al. “Oxygen Ordering and Orthorhombic-to-
Tetragonal Phase Transition in YBa2Cu3O7-x,” Physical Review B 16 (1987), pp. 3608-
3616.” 
104 Andrew Lawler, “U.S. Neutron Scientists Settle for Less,” Science 272 (1996), p. 730. 
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The IPNS, however, proved a hearty survivor.  As it competed for users, funding, 
and prestige,  Argonne’s pulsed neutron source gained some advantages because of the 
misfortunes of its competitors.  In the wake of heightened public concern about reactor 
safety after the 1986 Chernobyl accident,  the Oak Ridge and Brookhaven reactors were 
shut down for safety reviews (in 1986 and 1989 respectively), which limited running time 
for neutron scattering measurements through the end of the decade. Thanks to criticism 
from anti-nuclear critics, who worried that the ANS facility’s highly enriched fuel could 
be stolen, and complaints from fiscal conservatives annoyed that the price tag tripled over 
original estimates, the ANS lost its niche.  In early 1995, the DOE deleted the project 
from the federal budget.  As the stock of reactors fell,  the project that had threatened to 
steal Argonne’s niche suffered its own difficulties.  Los Alamos would upgrade and 
improve its pulsed source starting in the mid-1980s.  However, as University of 
California Santa Barbara physicist Walter Kohn stated in August 1995, up to that time the 
Los Alamos facility (by then called the Los Alamos Neutron Scattering Center or 
LANSCE), had experienced “many problems, design conflicts, scheduling conflicts,” and 
in addition, “its performance had fallen short of the original specifications.”105  
In light of the difficulties at Los Alamos, the IPNS ended up squeezing into a 
niche alongside its competitor.  By the late 1990s, the materials science and DOE 
ecosystems had developed sustainable niches for both the IPNS and LANCSE for the 
next ten years, in part because both projects had adapted to restricted resources and  in 
part because both projects ended up providing an highly useful resource -- expertise.  
DOE insisted after the problems with the ANS that the next big machine for materials 
science would be a pulsed neutron source rather than a reactor. Although both Argonne 
and Los Alamos (along with other laboratories) vied to have the new facility  (called the 
Spallation Neutron Source or SNS) built at their site, the 1986 deal struck by Trivelpiece 
(who in the meantime had become the Oak Ridge director) held:  DOE made it clear that 
the new facility would be built in Tennessee at Oak Ridge.  However, the IPNS and 
                                                
105 Quote as quoted in Jonathan Weisman, “Could Defense Accelerator be a Windfall for 
Science?” Science 269 (1995), 915. Also, Robert Pool, “Plea to Bromley:  Save Our 
Neutrons,” Science 246 (1989), p. 1553. Brookhaven’s reactor would be closed 
permanently in 1999.  For more on this episode, see Robert Crease, “Anxious History:  
The High Flux Beam Reactor and Brookhaven National Laboratory,” pp. 41-56. 
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LANSCE were in a prime position to help researchers at Oak Ridge, whose experience 
was in building reactors, not pulsed neutron sources.  In fact, Trivelpiece and Bill 
Appleton, a top manager for first the ANS then the SNS, brokered another deal, this one 
aimed at providing Oak Ridge with much needed expertise while reducing interference 
competition destructive to all concerned. In the end five laboratories agreed to help to 
build the SNS on the Oak Ridge site.  Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory took responsibility 
for the ion source, Los Alamos oversaw the low-energy section of the linear accelerator, 
Jefferson National Accelerator Facility undertook the superconducting high-energy end 
of the linear accelerator, Brookhaven designed the accumulator ring, and Argonne 
handled instruments and experimental facilities. Oak Ridge and Argonne participated in a 
staff exchange -- some Argonne staff members, such as Kent Crawford, were detached to 
Oak Ridge and some Oak Ridge personnel came to Argonne for the duration of the 
instrument design effort.  As Brown and Lander later concluded, the advent of the multi-
billion dollar Oak Ridge project was crucial to “prolonging the life of the IPNS.”106  
In 2001, the IPNS’s 20th anniversary, Brown retired and Ray Teller, who had been 
a post doctoral fellow at Argonne but had spent the intervening period in industry, 
became director.  It was a time for celebration.  By this time the IPNS had delivered 6.5 
billion pulses to neutron-producing targets and was operating with 95% reliability 
allowing 3550 users to perform 5000 experiments using 13 instruments.107  (Figure 4)  
                                                
106 Quote from private communication, Gerard Lander and Bruce Brown, July 26, 2007. 
Also: Daniel Clery and Andrew Lawler, “The Looming Neutron Gap,” Science 267 
(1995), pp. 952-954; Andrew Lawler, “Neutron Scattering:  Green Light for Long-
Awaited Facility,” Science 23 (1998), pp. 470-471.  
107 “IPNS Progress Report 1996-2001,” p. 158. 
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Figure 4.  The IPNS and instruments in 2001.  From: “IPNS Progress Report 1996-2001.” 
 
Meanwhile, the APS and other materials science facilities were stealing headlines. 
And in the end, the high-energy epithermal neutrons produced by the IPNS did not prove 
as dominant as initially expected in exploring materials for some branches of science. For 
example, the IPNS never produced fluxes high enough for many measurements of 
biological materials (although the introduction of cold neutron beams, highly efficient 
cryogenic moderators, and the installation of very effective small-angle scattering 
instruments went far to help this line of work). Nonetheless, by this time the pulsed 
neutron source had produced an impressive body of research.  In addition to the 
contributions of such cutting-edge work as Felcher’s measurements with neutron 
reflectometry and Jorgensen’s measurements of the structural properties of high-
temperature superconductors, IPNS researchers explored the momentum distributions in 
quantum liquids and solids, researched the static and dynamic structure of amorphous 
solids and liquids, worked on biological molecules and other materials, and conducted in 
situ structural studies at high pressure and studies on colossal magnetoresistive materials. 
As Brown would later summarize,  “a lot of our success was steadily and continuously 
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building up the data base,” a major contribution in a field in which success is measured in 
the steady accumulation of diverse information. 108   
At this point the fully mature facility also served an important function within 
Argonne.  Along with other medium-sized facilities, such as the Argonne Tandem Linear 
Accelerator System (ATLAS) and strong programs across a wide range of scientific and 
technological disciplines (such as continuing work on reactor studies, a budding program 
in transportation-related work, and research in environmental studies, chemistry, and 
biology), the IPNS contributed to the laboratory’s reputation and multidisciplinary mix of 
expertise. 109  
By this time, the IPNS had also made numerous contributions to the materials 
science community beyond scientific results.  IPNS researchers established user-friendly 
operation as the standard for U.S. materials science facilities.  In addition, their machine 
also served as a development center for neutron scattering instruments, moderators, and 
targets that were useful throughout the field. Also, although Argonne’s pulsed source was 
not the most capable of its kind, Carpenter and his team had pioneered the concept and 
were crucial to the successful construction and use of the cutting-edge tools of their day, 
first at ISIS, then at SNS, which began operation in 2006, and at the comparable Japan 
Spallation Neutron Source, JSNS, planned for 2008.110  Even though these machines 
were not at Argonne, their success proved that in the long run, Argonne had conceived 
and nurtured the right idea:  spallation neutron sources, not reactors, were the right 
neutron scattering machines for the 21st century. Despite its rocky inception and 
continued struggles, the IPNS had taken root, matured, and spread seeds for the future.  
 
 
                                                
108Quote from Catherine Westfall interview with Gerry Lander and Bruce Brown, June 
22, 2006.  Also: “IPNS Progress Report 1996-2001,” pp. ii, iv, 2-3, 122, 156, 158; Jim 
Jorgensen, “Scientific Highlight of Argonne’s Neutron Scattering Program,” June 22, 
2006. 
109 For an example of how the multidisciplinary mix of expertise and equipment 
facilitates small-scale research, see Catherine Westfall, “A Different Laboratory Tale:  
Fifty Years of Mössbauer Spectroscopy,” pp. 189-213.  “IPNS Progress Report 1996-
2001,” pp. 142-145; Jack Holl, Argonne National Laboratory,  pp. 416-422, 446-452, 
473-475, 483-488. 
110 Private communication, Gerard Lander and Bruce Brown, July 26, 2007.  
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Reflections:  The Ecosystems Perspective and the IPNS Story 
 
The twists and turns in the IPNS story are less perplexing if we view the IPNS as 
an organism struggling to find a sustainable niche in overlapping ecosystems. As in the 
wild, survival required constant adaptation.  Throughout its life the IPNS had to compete 
for resources in an ever-evolving environment. The project came to life when it appeared 
that Argonne, DOE, and the materials science community would happily provide 
resources (funding, users, prestige, institutional priority) to a new, premiere neutron 
scattering facility. But then DOE funding scarcity convinced the materials science 
community that it was best to fund existing reactor projects and a Los Alamos niche-
stealing enemy with a separate, military income stream.  Argonne scientists escaped 
extinction by trimming their project and its hours of operation,  finding, for a while, their 
own source of military funding, developing new research instruments,  and discovering 
efficiencies that allowed them to produce useful science on the cheap.  
Did the quality of IPNS science play a role in its survival?  Expert assessment of 
its quality certainly seemed to play a role. It seems unlikely that the second Brinkman 
panelists in 1982 would have stayed the IPNS death sentence if in their opinion the 
machine lacked scientific promise. And the IPNS surely would not have kept its funding 
through the 21st century if it had not lived up to that promise with cutting-edge research -- 
such as the work on high-temperature superconductivity as well as the steady flow of 
other useful measurements. On the other hand, the facility had faced extinction before it 
was given a chance to produce science and lived with the constant threat of death despite 
its successes and good reputation for productivity. Though necessary, scientific success 
was clearly not sufficient for survival. 
As often happens in nature, luck played a leading role in the IPNS’s struggle for 
survival.  Even as Europeans began operating more capable neutron scattering machines 
and synchrotron radiation light sources gained top priority in the U.S. and at Argonne, the 
IPNS emerged as a crucial resource because technical problems limited productivity at 
Los Alamos and the reactors at Brookhaven and Oak Ridge were shut down for safety 
reviews in the wake of Three Mile Island and Chernobyl (and the Brookhaven reactor 
was eventually shut down). Like many a successful competitor in an ecosystem, the IPNS 
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scratched a niche through adaptation and then continued to survive, at least in part,  
because it was in the right place at the right time. 
A particularly striking aspect of the IPNS story is the extent to which this story is 
linked with larger struggles for survival. The IPNS probably would not have survived the 
first Brinkman panel death sentence without the strong support of Argonne managers 
who were motivated by the threat to the laboratory’s survival and of the DOE, which, in 
turn, was more responsive to Argonne because DOE’s survival was also threatened. An 
ecosystem perspective is particularly useful in spotlighting the interdependence that 
linked Argonne, DOE, and the materials science community, as well showing as the 
potential fragility of the overall system.  Due to the mesh of inter-relationships, the 
destruction of one relatively small element in an ecosystem can cause a cataclysmic chain 
reaction of ecological disaster that engulfs the larger surrounding systems.  This is why 
scientific leaders repeatedly labored to cut deals so that every laboratory got a major 
project.  They needed to avoid destructive interference competition that could have led to 
the competitive exclusion of them all. And this fact of laboratory life helps explain how 
the IPNS maintained its niche into the 21st century.  As a mature facility, the IPNS was 
still useful as a scientific tool.  In addition, IPNS researchers (and their once and future 
competitors) pooled their expertise so that the laboratories, DOE, and materials science 
community could continue to grow and prosper. In the end, successful adaptation 
required preserving the larger ecosystem that sustained their common scientific life. 
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